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Executive summary 
This study was commissioned by UNDP to inform the process of drafting the Vietnam SEDS, 2011-
20 and other health sectoral policies. It aims to highlight some of the main health financing 
challenges facing Vietnam and to draw on international literature to produce recommendations as 
to how the country should respond to them. 
The study was conducted in January to April 2011. It is based on a review of the literature for 
health financing in Vietnam and in selected neighbouring and comparable countries, as well as 
secondary data from Vietnam, key informant visits and one field trip to Vinh Phuc Province. It is 
structured along the lines of the four key health financing functions – i) revenue collection; ii) risk 
pooling; iii) purchasing; and iv) provision of services.   
Vietnam has a legacy of good coverage with health infrastructure and relatively good health 
indicators. However, it faces escalating health care expenditure (total health expenditure was over 
6% of GDP in 2008 and heading towards 8-9% by 2015, which is high for a low-income country) 
and weak capacity to extend health insurance to all groups. Health insurance contributes only 
limited additional funding, despite covering 58% of the population.  It contributes 17% of overall 
expenditure, but the bulk of this (75%) comes from public subsidies.  
Overall, the government contributes 43% and household out of pocket payments contribute 52%. 
Increasing the public contribution in order to reduce out of pocket payments will be needed, if 
Vietnam is to reach towards universal coverage (not just breadth of population covered but also in 
relation to width of services covered and height of costs per service). Evidence on catastrophic 
spending also suggests that Vietnam should aim to reduce household out-of-pocket contributions 
below the level of 30-40% of total health expenditure. Studies on health insurance suggest that it 
may have had a limited effect on reducing households costs overall. Drugs spending alone over 
2000-7 has doubled, now absorbing 40% of total health expenditure. 
Increasing public contributions must be combined with measures to reduce cost escalation – 
especially, reformed provider payments and the development of better mechanisms for managing 
and regulating the health care market. The current total health spend is adequate to cover 
essential health care, if well used.  
Increased coverage will raise demand for services, which in other countries has increased the 
need for investment in infrastructure and staff. Given the extensive network in Vietnam, that is 
unlikely to be a short-term need, though the imbalance in use of primary and hospital services – 
which is already skewed towards the latter – may be exacerbated. 
Given this analysis and based on experiences of some other countries, the report makes the 
following recommendations. 
Moving towards universal coverage with effective financial protection 
 There is an urgent need to develop detailed plans and projected resource requirements for 
insurance expansion at province level up to the end of 2014.  This analysis will be important to 
manage expectations regarding health insurance coverage uptake.  How feasible is universal 
coverage by 2014?  The international literature highlights that the bulk of those currently 
without insurance in Vietnam are notoriously difficult to enrol and hence considerable effort and 
resources will be required to increase coverage of the remaining groups.  Whilst the   Ministry 
of Health has undertaken some initial exploratory work with provinces to understand the 
feasibility of reaching universal coverage by 2014 (MoH, 2011) it is important to quantify the 
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resource requirements needed for the VSS to manage the process over the period up to 2014.  
Some analysis of expected enrolment using different implementation tactics should be explored 
further.  There are likely to be initial investment costs associated with enrolment coupled with 
recurrent costs.  The development of annual business plans and annual reports outlining 
projected coverage should be encouraged.     
 The experience from Thailand and China shows that increasing state subsidies can provide the 
impetus towards achieving universal coverage.  Currently, the bulk of funding for insurance 
comes from general taxes paid into state budget and passed to the VSS (75%).  The costs of 
subsidising universal coverage have been estimated in a recent World Bank study (Liebermann 
and Wagstaff, 2009).  An updated analysis of the feasibility of covering the remainder of the 
population via the state budget and the fiscal implications of this approach should be produced 
in alignment with the proposed roadmap for achieving universal coverage.   
 Clear guidelines should be produced for roles and procedures for identifying the near poor at 
the provincial level. 
 Once the resource implications of enrolling the remaining groups have been elaborated, 
funding mechanisms should be agreed for each province. Vietnam might want to adapt from 
the approaches used in some FSU countries. In the Czech Republic, for example, there is a 
monthly central budget transfer for the economically inactive population set at 13.5% of the 
average wage. Another example is the Republic of Moldova, where the health insurance law 
specified that the per capita contributions from the budget on behalf of state-insured individuals 
must be equivalent to the estimated average per capita cost of the benefits package. 
 Support should be given to each province to develop an action plan, which starts from a 
problem diagnosis (who is uncovered and why). Factors depressing demand for health 
insurance need careful discussion at each level, and actions to address them. If the service is 
perceived as cumbersome or of low quality or inaccessible, then clearly voluntary membership 
will remain low. 
 For private companies, a carrot and stick approach might be adopted, with companies enrolling 
their employees on a regular and comprehensive basis given a discount (and those resisting 
facing some form of sanction, such as a fine) 
 Since 2003 the VSS has been responsible for collecting premiums for private sector enterprise 
workers and this has proved problematic, as witnessed by the low number of private enterprise 
workers currently enrolled in health insurance.  Alternative mechanisms for premium collection 
should be considered, including the use of the existing tax collection system.  This has been 
successful in a number of the FSU countries, such as Estonia. An analysis of the efficiency of 
existing VSS premium collection needs to be undertaken and a review of alterative premium 
collection mechanisms should be undertaken.  
 Vietnam should learn from the experience of countries where high coverage has achieved 
significant reductions in household spending. Thailand is one such example 
Reforming provider payment systems 
 A strategic decision needs to be made whether the longer term goal is to unify purchasing into 
a single payer (the VSS), with the MoH refocusing on policy setting and market regulation. This 
will have implications for the process of implementation of provider payment reform and for the 
development of the relationship between the MoH and the VSS. One model for integrated 
purchasing might be Kyrgyzstan, where the state budget transfers most of the funds for health 
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from general revenues to the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) to provide a basic 
package on behalf of the entire population. In addition, payroll taxes are transferred to the 
MHIF, in order to achieve a complementary contributory entitlement for the insured population. 
 Considerable capacity building of the VSS will be needed if it is to be effective as an active 
purchaser of the bulk of health care services. 
 If Vietnam moves towards a single payer, based on real costs of care, then user fees should be 
reformed, set either as a small fixed amount (co-payment) or proportion (co-insurance) of each 
treatment. Other informal and supplementary payments should be eliminated. 
 Vietnam should move towards the payment mix which may other countries have moved 
towards, which includes capitation payments for primary care, case-based (or DRG) payments 
for hospital care, and target payments for some high-priority and preventive services.  
 The new payment systems should be monitored in relation to quality of care and cost control. 
They should be based on real costs and linked to rational care guidelines (see below). These 
could be incorporated in service contracts. 
 Based on the international evidence on provider payment reform, an incremental approach to 
reform is recommended, based on the piloting currently underway. An incremental approach 
gradually shifts financial risk to hospitals, allowing them time to adapt to the new incentives, 
and provides the opportunity to establish information systems and accumulate the data 
necessary to refine the payment system. In many countries there is an incremental inclusion of 
hospitals, diseases covered, and also an incremental inclusion of costs included in the 
payment as the system involves.    
 As with insurance coverage, it will be important to develop a more detailed plan for provider 
payment reform at the national level and the development of implementation guidelines at the 
province level. Even if piloted approaches are successful, they will not automatically be 
adopted by all providers. Some form of transitional benefits may be needed to encourage 
adoption (as used in South Korea, where a generous margin was allowed at the time of 
switching from fee for service). The benefits to providers of simpler and more transparent 
charging can be emphasised. A study tour to areas of China which have successfully reduced 
costs through provider payment reform might help to convince hospital managers. 
 Reform of pay for providers, and its streamlining, must ultimately be accompanied by 
streamlining of pay for medical staff, who currently draw on a wide range of sources, formal 
and informal, which again creates mixed incentives in terms of patient care.  
 Provider payment reform is one tool which can be used to improve the balance in the 
Vietnamese system between hospital and primary care – the former being overutilised at 
present and the latter under-utilised. Management of the growing burden of NCDs can best be 
handled at primary level, and payment systems for providers and staff can incentivise this 
work, and reduce the flow of patients and staff to hospitals. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, a portion of the (capitation) rate is paid in the form of a bonus if cost containment or 
health promotion targets are met. The case of Kyrgyzstan is also instructive, where payment 
reform was used as a tool for addressing over-capacity in hospitals, and generating savings to 
reinvest in primary care. 
 
 
  Oxford Policy Management v 
Managing and regulating the health care market 
 The experience of other countries in relation to health technology assessment should be 
studied. In particular, there needs to be an agency which assesses new technologies both 
prospectively (when should the specific technology be used?) and retrospectively (i.e. how did 
the technology impact decisions on patient care). This would be linked to licensing of 
technology for use in specific settings. 
 The ability of clinicians and managers to profit from private investment in equipment produces 
a conflict of interest and should be forbidden, with appropriate sanctions applied for any 
infringement. 
 Linked to a streamlined purchasing function, the use of a limited number of core clinical 
guidelines (for the most common conditions) should be reinforced. The process of their 
production should be speeded up, simplified and they should be widely disseminated. 
Payments should be based on and costed on the basis of compliance with the guidelines. 
Experience from China and Taiwan suggest that considerable cost savings can be generated 
through increased use of clinical guidelines. 
 A range of quality control measures should be developed, including accreditation of all 
providers and the piloting of clinical auditing. Borrowing from China’s experience, independent 
quality reviews by expert panels or routine monitoring of high-tech services could be 
considered.  
 Patient voice should also be encouraged to report any abuses, including poor conduct and 
over-charging. 
 The mechanism for pharmaceutical procurement needs to be reformed to ensure lower drug 
prices, while strengthening checking and monitoring of the tendering process for drugs in 
hospitals. 
 Experience of contracting services from the private sector could gradually be developed in 
Vietnam, using experiences from countries like Australia. The contracting skills developed in 
the process can be applied to public and private sector alike, particularly if the current trend 
towards autonomisation of public hospitals continues. 
 The balance of investments in primary versus hospital care need to be reviewed. A recent 
analysis (Wagstaff and Bredenkamp, 2011) found that only 2.5% of government spending was 
received by CHC and polyclinic level, compared to 97.5% by hospitals. This reinforces the 
need to rebalance the system. 
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1 Background 
1.1 Study objectives   
Health sector development and modernisation efforts are gathering pace in Vietnam.  A number of 
key health financing strategies have recently been defined (see, for example, the health section 
within the SED Strategy 2011-2020), or are currently being finalised (draft MoH Health strategy 
2010-2020).  There have been detailed discussions on implementation plans (e.g. the JAHR 2010 
report focuses on implementation of the five year plan for the period 2011-2015). In these 
documents there are, amongst other policy developments, commitments to increasing the state 
budget for health care; a roadmap for universal coverage, and broad strategies and plans to reform 
the current provider payment system for health care in Vietnam. 
The study was commissioned by the Development Strategy Unit with funding from the United 
Nations Development Programme. The terms of reference state that the paper should provide 
clear recommendations for all levels of the Vietnamese health system and include: 
 a review of regional and international experiences in financing the modernization and 
development of health services, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
approaches;  
 an assessment of Viet Nam’s current health sector and financing arrangements; and  
 recommendations for future health sector development priorities and financing channels in 
Viet Nam. 
The study focuses on the four key health financing functions – i) revenue collection; ii) risk pooling; 
iii) purchasing; and iv) provision of services.  It draws on selected international experience to 
explore how countries in the region and beyond have designed and implemented policies to 
address key health financing and delivery challenges.  It then considers what lessons Viet Nam 
might learn from these experiences as the country moves forward with implementation of key 
health system modernisation and development strategies.  
 
1.2 Data and research methods 
The study was undertaken between January and April 2011. It was based on a structured literature 
review of health financing in Vietnam and international experiences on selected health financing 
themes which emerged as most relevant for the Vietnamese context. This was supplemented by a 
visit to Vietnam to interview key local policy makers, health officials and workers and international 
partners and the collection of secondary data from a number of sources.   
Health financing reform in Vietnam has been the focus of a number of detailed assessments by the 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Labour office and others in recent years (e.g. 
Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009), Long (2008), Ekman and Bales (2008), Castel, (2010)).  A 
recent UNICEF report has also focused on health equity in Vietnam, with specific focus on 
maternal and child mortality (UNICEF, 2009).  The Joint annual Reviews for 2008 and 2010 
(MoH/HPG, 2008/2010) provide detailed analysis of the health financing and delivery challenges, 
as well as a comprehensive description and recommendations in other areas of the system.  
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Finally, a recent report by the Ministry of Health (MoH, 2011) is widely cited as it provides the most 
recent situation analysis of health insurance uptake and challenges for universal coverage.  
The international literature review was limited mainly to countries in the region, particularly China 
and Thailand, which are seen as offering relevant experiences.  The study however has attempted 
to explore experiences further afield, including the former Soviet Union and central and eastern 
Europe.  The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of health sector development in 
Vietnam and places this into context with other countries in the region.  It then moves on to 
consider key health policy goals and how health financing strategy can be used to align with these 
goals.  The following sections of the report focus on (1) revenue collection, (2) risk pooling, (3) 
purchasing, and (4) provision.  The sections that follow address a number of questions that came 
out of discussions with local stakeholders. First, what are the key implementation challenges that 
need to be addressed in order to move towards universal coverage?  Second, what are the 
respective roles of the MoH and insurance agency as insurance develops, particularly where the 
purchasing function is taken on predominately by the insurance agency. Third, how have countries 
moved from a fee for service, or norms-based provider payment system, to one based on 
performance or outputs? Fourth, how can hospital autonomy be effectively regulated and how best 
to develop public private partnerships?. Fifth, is there an appropriate role for private health care 
provision and if so what is this role? Sixth, how can pharmaceutical prices be better regulated?  
These are significant questions, each one warranting more than a section in this report.  It is 
anticipated however that the sections that follow offer some insights to discussions on 
implementation.     
1.3 Socio-economic context 
The socio-economic context strongly influences health sector development and therefore provides 
a useful starting point for the analysis that follows.  Analysis of countries in the region shows 
considerable differences in population size, proportion of the population living in urban areas, 
income per capita, poverty rates and human development indexes (Table 1.1).  Socio-economic 
indicators for selected countries 
 Pop (‘000s) 
% living in 
Urban 
areas 
Gross National 
Income per capita 
(PPP Int. $) 
Population living 
off < $1 (PPP 
Int $) a day (%) 
Human 
Development 
Index1 
Country 2008 2008 2000 2008 2000-2007 2007 
Vietnam 87,096 28 1,390 2,700 21.5 116 
Thailand 67,386 33 4,610 5,990 < 2.0 87 
Philippines 90,348 65 2,430 3,990 22.6 105 
Rep. of Korea 48,152 81 17,050 28,120 Na 26 
Indonesia 227,345 52 2,240 3,830 Na 111 
Singapore 4,615 100 32,880 47,940 Na 23 
Malaysia 27,014 70 8,350 13,740 <2.0 66 
China 1,344,920 43 2,330 6,020 16 92 
Source: ADB (2010) 
For example in 2008 Gross National Income per capita (measured by PPP Int. $) ranged from 
$47,940 in Singapore to $2,700 in Viet Nam.  However, it should be noted that income per capita 
nearly doubled in Viet Nam between 2000 and 2008.   
                                               
1 The Human Development Index is constructed by combining proxies for three important aspects of human welfare: 
health, education, and a decent standard of living. Health is represented by life expectancy; education by literacy and 
school enrolment; and standard of living by GDP per capita. UNDP’s latest index covers 182 economies (1=highest 
ranking, 182=lowest ranking) 
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Vietnam and Philippines have similar levels of poverty - 21.5% and 22.6% respectively (defined as 
the proportion of population living off less than $1 (PPP Int. $) per day).  The proportion of 
population living in urban areas is high in Singapore (100%) and Republic of Korea (81%) 
compared with Viet Nam (28%).   
The global downturn has impacted Vietnam’s economy with a decline in GDP growth from 8.8% in 
2005 to 6.2% in 2008 and an increase in inflation from 8.4% to 22.9% over the same period (Son 
et al., 2010).  Castel (2010) states that as a result of food price rises the number of people under 
the poverty line increased from 19.3 million at the end of 2008 (12.1% of the population) to 20.3 
million at the end of 2009 (15.7% of the population).  The increase in the number of poor has 
important implications for health financing policy as it increases the potential number of population 
requiring a health insurance subsidy by government.  Furthermore, given the limited depth of 
insurance coverage (that is the level of health benefits offered to the insured) increasing poverty 
leaves families vulnerable to the financial consequences associated with accessing (or not 
accessing) health care.  This issue is addressed in the section on risk-pooling, but in summary the 
equity implications of the economic downturn require further analysis and suggest that during 
periods of economic turbulence careful attention to vulnerable groups is required. 
Table 1.1 Health Status Indicators for selected countries 
  
Life Expectancy at birth (2008) 
Infant Mortality 
Rate (per 1000 live 
births) 
Maternal Mortality 
Rate (per 100,000 
live births) 
Country Male Female Both 2008 2000-2009 
Viet Nam 70 75 73 12 75 
Thailand 66 74 70 13 14 
Philippines 67 74 70 26 162 
Rep. of Korea 76 83 80 5 15 
Indonesia 66 69 67 6 307 
Singapore 79 83 81 2 8 
Malaysia 71 76 73 6 28 
China 72 76 74 18 34 
Source:  WHO (2010) 
 
Viet Nam’s commitment to improving health is well documented (e.g. Ekman and Bales, 2008, 
Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009).  Life expectancy and rates of infant mortality are comparable to 
those of countries with substantially higher per capita incomes (Table 1.2).  For example, in 2008, 
combined male/female life expectancy at birth in Viet Nam was 73 years, whereas in the 
Philippines and Thailand it was 70 years.  Infant mortality rates for Viet Nam are slightly lower than 
China (12 and 18 per 1000 live births respectively).  Maternal mortality rates in Viet Nam 
(75/100,000) are much lower than the Philippines (162/100,000) and Indonesia (307/100,000), but 
higher than both Thailand (75/100,000) and China (34/100,000).    
The disease pattern in Vietnam is reflected by a mix of communicable and non-communicable 
disease (Figure 1.1). Non-communicable diseases such as cardio-vascular disease, cancers, 
mental illness and injuries due to accidents have increased in recent years and communicable 
diseases have decreased.  It should be stressed however that although the morbidity patterns 
have moved towards greater prevalence of non-communicable diseases, communicable diseases 
continue to exhibit complex dynamics. Many dangerous communicable diseases are at risk of re-
emerging such as cholera, dengue fever, HIV, TB, malaria etc. 
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Communicable diseases accounted for 55.5% of total morbidity in 1976, but had fallen to 25.2% by 
2008. Non-communicable diseases have shown continuous increases from 42.7% in 1976 to 
63.1% in 2008 (MoH/HPG 2010).  Variations in morbidity and mortality across the country have 
important equity implications.  A recent UNICEF report highlights variations in maternal and child 
mortality by income group (UNICEF, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.1 Morbidity trends 1976-2008 (communicable and non-communicable 
disease)  
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1.4 Health policy goals and health financing strategy 
Health policy goals in Vietnam are reflected in a number of documents, including the draft SED 
strategy 2011-2020, and align with the four basic health system goals defined by the World health 
Organisation (WHO 2010b) which are i) to improve the people’s health; ii) to improve system 
responsiveness; iii) to protect the people from financial risks; and iv) to raise the efficiency of the 
entire system.  Health financing strategies can promote these goals through the following 
measures (MoH/HPG 2010):   
 ensuring that per capita health expenditure is maintained at a reasonable level, through 
appropriate mobilisation of social resources; 
 guaranteeing that public financial resources account for a larger proportion than private 
funds in total national health expenditure;    
 reducing the percentage of households falling into poverty due to expenditures on health 
care; and  
 improving the effectiveness in allocation and use of health financial resources, increasing 
both efficiency (lowering costs) and service quality.   
1.4.1 The Socio-Economic Development Strategy (2011-2020) 
The SED Strategy (2011-2020) is at an advanced stage of development and includes a section 
dedicated to health and the health sector.  The section is brief but makes references to a large 
number of strategies.  Table 1.3 provides a summary of the key strategies outlined in the draft 
document.  Emphasis is placed on consolidating grassroots care and enhanced capacity of 
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commune health centres; preventative care with reference made to both HIV and child malnutrition; 
renovation and building of hospitals at different levels; expanding health insurance, and increasing 
state and “socialisation” efforts and targeting the poor.  Ensuring the equity, efficiency and quality 
of the delivery system is also a stated strategy, as is ensuring doctors are available at the level of 
the rural commune.    
   
Table 1.2 Draft SEDS strategy 
No Health Strategies outlined in the Draft SEDS document 
1 Increased state investments coupled with increased socialisation efforts 
2 Consolidate grassroots health care. Enhance capacity of commune health centres. 
3 Complete the building of district hospitals and upgrade provincial and national hospitals 
4 Encourage all sectors to build high-quality specialised medical facilities 
5 Tackle overload in hospitals 
6 Further develop autonomy, openness and transparency of state health facilities 
7 Ensure delivery of equitable, efficient and quality health services 
8 Standardise quality of health services and hospitals towards gradually reaching regional and 
international standards 
9 Refine and improve policies related to health insurance, medical examination and treatment, 
and fees for health care 
10 Work out road map towards universal insurance 
11 Improve implementation of policies related to targeted priority groups (poor, children and the 
elderly) 
12 Improved training of health workers 
13 Ensure doctors are available in rural communes and urban wards 
14 Develop preventative care, including HIV prevention, reduction of child malnutrition, food 
hygiene.  
15 Develop rapidly pharmaceutical and medical industries. 
16 Develop strongly traditional medicine in combination with modern medicine 
17 Develop and implement national strategy for raising physical health of the Vietnamese 
people, through sport and exercise 
Source:  GoV, SED Strategy Draft 2010-2020 
 
1.4.2 Draft Health Strategy 2010-2020 (Forth Draft) 
The draft Health Strategy 2010-2020 focuses on strengthening the health care network, promoting 
preventative care, population and family planning, curative care, development of human resources 
and the pharmaceutical sector.  Specific health financing strategies referred to in the document 
include the continued increase in investment for health, particularly for priority groups; allocation of 
budget based on results / outcomes; movement towards universal health insurance which is 
affordable; mobilisation of other sources of investment (“socialisation”) for the sector; continued 
implementation of hospital autonomy policies whilst addressing overuse of high-tech services; 
incremental reform of provider payments (capitation, case based or DRGs); and ensure financing 
policy supports priority groups (poor, near poor, children under 6, elderly, minority groups) to 
ensure access.   
1.4.3 The Joint Annual Health Review (2010) focussed on 5-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
The health financing chapter of the document proposes “appropriate solutions that can be included 
in the health sector’s 5-year plan for 2011-2015” (MoH / HPG 2011) and includes a number of 
recommendations relating to i) increasing the share of public financing for health; ii) raising the 
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efficiency in the allocation and use of health financing resources; and iii) strengthening medical 
cost controls.  Reference to these proposals will be made in subsequent sections.   
1.5 Summary of health sector strategies and implementation plans   
There is recognition that private spending on health care is too high and that government spending 
needs to increase.  Further strategies focus on attaining universal health insurance by the year 
2014 and a roadmap has been defined to achieve this.  Provider payment reform is also a high 
priority, with a number of local documents highlighting the impact that current FFS and norm-based 
budgets are having on health sector efficiency and cost containment. 
The following sections focus on these strategies, considering some of the implementation issues to 
be tackled.  They are structured according to the four key health financing functions (revenue 
generation, risk pooling, purchasing and provision). 
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2 Revenue Generation 
2.1 Overview 
This section examines trends in health financing in recent years in Vietnam and includes a review 
of sources and type of expenditure.  A comparative regional review of expenditures is also 
presented.  As will be shown, the bulk of spending in Vietnam is from private out-of-pocket 
spending. This section considers some of the main drivers of health expenditures and considers 
projections for future funding based on international experiences.   
2.1.1 Health spending trend and future projections 
Total health expenditure, as a proportion of gross national product (GDP) has risen steadily over 
the past ten years.  In 1998 the figure was 4.9% and it stood at 6.4% in 2008 (Figure 2.2 below).  
Per capita health spending in Vietnam in 2008 was VND 1.1 million, which when calculated in 
purchasing power parity terms is equivalent to US$PPP 178. Per capita health spending has 
increased rapidly when calculated in current prices, there was an increase of 4.6 times between 
1998 and 2008.   
Figure 2.1 Health Spending trend 1998-2008 
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Source:  MoH / HPG (2010) 
 
Forecasts indicate that, in 2015, total health expenditures could amount to 8.8% of GDP and public 
health expenditures to 3.4% of GDP (Castel 2010).  From a health insurance funding perspective 
Castel suggests that if in 2015 the state budget finances half this budget, to match the rest, health 
insurance must raise the equivalent of about 1.7% of GDP in 2015.  
2.1.2 Sources of funding and spending by activity 
A review of funding sources for health care shows an increase in public funding for health in recent 
years, which in 2008 amounted to 43% of total health spending (MoH/HPG 2010).  The 2010 Joint 
annual Health Review states that according to preliminary results, the rate of growth of state 
spending on health in 2009 is higher than the average growth in the state budget.  The share of 
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total state budget spent on health increased from 4.8% in 2002 to 7.4% in 2007 and preliminary 
estimates for 2008 put this share at 10.2% (MoH/HPG 2010).   
The health sector has also received funds mobilized from state treasury bonds to invest in 
infrastructure for district general hospitals and inter-district regional hospitals.  In 2008 and 2009 
VND 3.7 trillion and VND 3.0 trillion were allocated to upgrading projects from treasury bonds 
(MoH/HPG, 2010). 
With the increase in the public finance share out of total government spending, household out-of-
pocket spending has fallen. In Vietnam, household out-of-pocket spending as a share of total 
health spending has fallen from 65% in 2005 to 52% in 2008 (MoH/HPG, 2010). 
Increased priority has been given to preventative medicine over the past few years. National 
Assembly Resolution No. 18/2008/QH12 (GoV, 2008) directs that “at least 30% of state budget 
health spending be reserved for preventive medicine”.  According to data from the National Health 
Accounts 2004-2007, the share of spending on preventive medicine out of total state budget 
spending on health increased rapidly in 2006, reaching 30.7%, compared to the 2005 share of 
23.9% (MoH/HPG, 2010). 
The state transfers for health insurance are expected to increase from about 0.36% of GDP in 
2009 to 0.5% of GDP in 2010 and to remain stable as a share of GDP in the years to 2020 (Castel 
2010).  The author states that two factors explain the increase.   First, starting in 2010, the state 
budget will cofinance half the cost of students’ health insurance cards. Second, in 2010 the official 
poverty line will be adjusted and the lists of the poor will be totally revised. With the current poverty 
line, households with per capita income lower than VND200,000 per month in rural areas, and 
VND260,000 in urban areas, are defined as “poor.” These thresholds are likely to be increased in 
2010 to VND300,000 and VND390,000, respectively (Check have they been increased). ILSSA 
projects that with these new levels, the number of registered poor may reach 12.3 million in 2010. 
This larger number should lead to an increase of about VND1.1 billion in state subsidies for the 
poor. 
 
2.2 Regional comparisons 
As with many countries of a similar socio-economic level, private in Viet Nam is high relative to 
public spending (Table 2.4).  There has however been a notable reduction in private spending in 
Vietnam in recent years.  In 2005% private spending stood at 65% whereas in 2008 the figure was 
reduced to 52% of total spending (MoH/HPG 2010). 
The level of private spending is still considerably higher than Thailand, which has seen a reduction 
in private payments from 43.9% in 2000 to 26.8% in 2007 over the same period.  Vietnam’s private 
expenditure is now slightly lower than China (55.3%) and Malaysia (55.6%) and higher than the 
Republic of Korea (45.1%), Indonesia (54.5%) and the Philippines (34.7%). 
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Table 2.3 Health Financing Indicators, Selected countries 
 Country 
Total 
expenditure 
on health as 
% of gross 
domestic 
product 
(GDP) 
Government 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
total 
expenditure on 
health 
Private 
expenditure on 
health as % of 
total 
expenditure on 
health 
Per capita total Spending 
on health (PPP - int. $) 
 2007 2007 2007 2000 2007 
Viet Nam 6.2 39.3%  60.7 76 183 
Thailand 3.7 73.2 26.8 159 286 
Philippines 3.9 34.7 65.3 79 130 
Rep. of Korea 6.3 54.9 45.1 809 1688 
Indonesia 2.2 54.5 45.5 48 81 
Singapore 3.1 32.6 67.4 1167 1643 
Malaysia 4.4 44.4 55.6 304 604 
China 4.3 44.7 55.3 108 233 
Source: WHO, 2010 
 
The continued high level of private payments highlights a lack of protection from the financial 
consequences of illness.  Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009) report that  in 1997-98, over 15% of the 
Vietnamese people recorded out-of-pocket health expenses that exceeded 25% of their 
discretionary income (measured as non-food consumption).  
The World Health Organisation Health Financing Strategy for the Pacific Region (2010-2015) 
propose that if progress towards universal coverage is to be made out-of-pocket spending should 
not exceed 30%–40% of total health expenditure (WHO, 2010) 
Table 2.4 Table: Tax Revenue as % of GDP, Selected Countries 
Country 1990 2000 2009 
Viet Nam  11.5 18.0 20.3 
Thailand 16.6 13.2 14.6 
Philippines 14.1 13.7 12.8 
Korea, Rep. of  14.8 17.9 15.5 
Indonesia 17.8 8.3 11.6 
Singapore 14.6 15.1 … 
Malaysia 17.8 13.2 15.7 
China 15.1 12.7 17.7 
Source:  ADB (2010) 
 
Tax clearly plays a substantial role in subsidising health care in Viet Nam.  Tax subsidies are used 
on both the demand side (to pay for premiums for specific groups) and on the supply side (budgets 
for health providers and salaries for health workers).  Viet Nam’s tax revenue collection as a 
proportion of GDP almost doubled in the period 1990-2005 from 11.5% to 22.8% (Table 2.5).  
Revenue collection declined in 2009 but Viet Nam still manages to collect more tax revenue than 
any of the countries in the review.   
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2.3 Is there a funding gap?  
Vietnam’s total health expenditure stood at 6.4% of GDP in 2008 (MoH/HPG 2010).  Forecasts 
suggest that spending could rise to 8.8% of GDP by 2015 (Castel, 2010).  There are likely to be a 
number of factors which are driving increased health expenditures.  For example, there is a 
correlation between income and health spending.  As Vietnam moves towards middle income 
country status, based on international experience health expenditures are predicted to increase.  
However there are other important factors relating to changing demographics, disease profile, and 
importantly the provider payment system and provider regulation (e.g. increased autonomy). 
It is argued that the rise in non-communicable diseases has led to a rapid escalation in health care 
costs, because the costs of treatment are 40 to 50 times higher than treatment of communicable 
diseases (due to the requirement for high technology diagnostics, drugs and prolonged treatment 
periods).  For example, heart surgery can cost from 100 to 150 million VND and a course of 
treatment for hypertension from 20 to 30 million VND (MoH/HPG 2010).  A recent survey of the 
average costs of outpatient and inpatient treatment for insured patients in 16 hospitals in 2005 and 
2008 found that the average cost for one outpatient visit had increased in all hospitals and was 
between 2.3 to 3 times higher in 2008 than in 2005.  The increases were highest in district and 
provincial hospitals.  Average costs for inpatient admissions during the same period were 2 times 
higher in 2008 compared to 2005 (MoH/HPG 2010).      
It is highly likely that the strong promotion of social mobilization, joint ventures, business 
partnerships in public hospitals and fee-for-service payment system also play an important role in 
driving expenditures, given the incentives associated with the fee for service payment system.  The 
results of the 2007 Hospital inventory indicates that the main source of revenues for hospitals is 
user fees (accounting for 59.4% of the total) and this has increased 26.5% compared with 2006 
(Liebermann and Wagstaff, 2009). 
The nature of health care benefits provided as part of an insurance benefit package will determine 
costs.  A recent estimate of the cost of providing key health services suggests that low-income 
countries would need to spend just less than US$44 per capita on average in 2009, rising to a little 
more than US$60 per capita by 2015. This estimate includes the cost of expanding health systems 
so that they can deliver all of the specified mix of interventions. It includes interventions targeting 
non-communicable diseases and those for the conditions that are the focus of the health-related 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (WHO, 2010).  Viet Nam currently spends $183 (PPP Int. 
$) per capita on health which suggests that the country can afford key services.  The challenge 
however is how resources can be pooled to ensure those individuals who require health services 
are able to access them, and also how these resources can be channelled to key services, rather 
than care which may yield little benefit. These are the subject of the next sections of this report. 
2.4 Summary 
The international experience shows that the revenue collection challenge for health is two-fold: 1) 
how to raise overall general government revenues; and 2) how to raise new funds that could go 
directly to health in a way that reduces the financial barriers to care such as the burden of out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditures on health.  The obligation to pay directly for services at the time of 
need presents a barrier to people seeking care when they do not have the financial means at hand; 
this has a particularly dire impact on the poor.  New sources of funds should aim to increase the 
proportion of prepaid contribution mechanisms over OOP expenditures. 
Vietnam appears to be making good progress in relation to increasing government expenditure and 
reducing private expenditures.  There are concerns however about the sustainability of funding.  
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Whilst some of these concerns relate to the changing socio-demographic and health profile, much 
is also driven by the way in which services are purchased, resources allocated and providers are 
paid and regulated.  
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3 Risk Pooling 
3.1 Introduction 
The achievement of universal coverage by 2014 is a key strategy for Viet Nam. To date, 58% of 
the population are enrolled in either the compulsory or voluntary schemes.  Approximately 36 
million people are currently not covered (MoH, 2011). The aim is to incrementally increase 
coverage between 2011-2014 to attain universal coverage and to ensure that the risk related to 
financing health care is borne by all groups of the population and not by specific groups or 
individuals.    Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009) state that expanding coverage to a larger section of 
the population; deepening coverage so that patients pay a smaller fraction of the cost out-of-
pocket; and cost containment are three main challenges facing the system. 
 
The World Health Organisation Health Financing Strategy for the Pacific Region (2010-2015) 
proposes four target indicators to monitor and evaluate overall progress in attaining universal 
coverage (WHO, 2010b); i) out-of-pocket spending should not exceed 30%–40% of total health 
expenditure; ii) total health expenditure should be at least 4%–5% of the gross domestic product; 
iii) over 90% of the population should be covered by prepayment and risk pooling schemes; and iv) 
close to 100% coverage of vulnerable populations with social assistance and safety-net 
programmes.  As was shown in the previous section, out-of-pocket spending is well over the WHO 
target and this section also highlights gaps in total coverage and in coverage of vulnerable groups.  
Whilst total health spending exceeds the WHO target, the bulk of funding is sourced from out of 
pocket spending.    
This section reviews Viet Nam’s progress in moving towards universal coverage and begins with a 
brief overview of trends in insurance coverage by groups in the compulsory and voluntary 
schemes, highlighting current gaps in coverage.  This is followed by an assessment of how health 
insurance status impacts on access to care, health expenditures and financial protection.  The 
government has outlined a roadmap for universal coverage with sequencing of group expansion.  
The section continues with a review of international experience in expanding coverage.  A number 
of countries in the region have achieved universal coverage or have a high proportion of their 
population covered by insurance.  The Republic of Korea (Xu et al., 2010) and Malaysia (Yu, 2008) 
have achieved universal coverage; Thailand has achieved near universal coverage (98% of its 
population) (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008), and China covers 87% of its population 
(Meng and Tang, 2010), albeit with concerns about the depth of this coverage.  The experiences of 
these latter two countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe will be reviewed.  Specifically, the financing of expansion to universal coverage is reviewed 
and issues relating to implementation and impact – in terms of access and financial protection - are 
assessed.  The final section considers these lessons within the Viet Nam context. 
3.2 Overview of Health Insurance 
As with many other countries in the region, the development of health insurance in Viet Nam has 
followed an incremental approach.  Introduced in 2003 following the issuance of Decree 299, the 
compulsory scheme initially covered state officials and civil servants, state enterprise workers, 
those receiving social security allowance and employees working in non-state enterprises (where 
greater than 10 employees were registered.   Decrees 58 (1998) and Decree 63 (2005) provided 
the legal framework for further enrolment of a number of other groups including the elderly, foreign 
students, kindergarten teachers, relatives of military personnel and the police, the poor and army 
veterans.  A Health Insurance Law was passed in 2008 and came into effect in July 2009 which 
extended compulsory insurance further to cover children under 6 years old and near-poor.  
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Students, dependents of the compulsory insured and those working in the informal sector are 
currently to be covered via the voluntary scheme2.  The compulsory and voluntary schemes are 
administered by the Viet Nam Social Security (VSS) and currently cover approximately 58% of the 
population (see figure below).  Approximately 36 million individuals currently remain uninsured.3 
The proportion of total health spending from health insurance fund was 17.6% in 2008 (MoH/ HPG 
2010). 
3.2.1.1 Trends in health insurance coverage 
Health insurance coverage increased steadily between 1993 and 2003 with approximately 20% of 
the population covered by the end of this period (Figure 3.3.  Between 2003 and 2010, the figure 
increased to 58% as large numbers of the poor and children under six were incorporated into the 
scheme.  Even though the contributions for both these groups are covered by state subsidies, 
100% coverage is still to be attained.  It is important to note that the government subsidised health 
insurance contributions for 11 out of 24 categories in 2010 (JAHR 2010).4   
Figure 3.2 Trend in health insurance coverage (1993-2010) 
Health Insurance coverage 1993-2010
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3.2.1.2 Composition of the insured 
The bulk of the insured are either covered by the compulsory scheme or classified as “poor” with 
subsidies paid by the state (Figure 3.4).  From 2006, the number of poor people issued with health 
                                               
2 See the recent report by the MoH (2010) on the possibility of implementing universal health insurance and the Joint 
Annual Health Review 2008 (MoH/HPG, 2008) for a detailed history of the development of health insurance. 
3 See Annex C for a detailed breakdown of insured by group and region. 
4 The precise number of categories requires confirmation.  The recently published “Viet Nam Social Security” document 
recently published by the VSS (2010) lists 28 categories. 
 
 
 
Decree 299 (1992, imp. 2003); Officials 
and public workers, workers in SOEs, 
foreign workers in state enterprises> 10 
employees, pensioners, unemployed. 
Decree 58 (1998) Representatives of 
National Assembly, People’s Council; 
teachers at kindergartens, social target 
group, dependants of military officers; 
Decree 63 (2006) Workers in non 
state enterprises of 1 or more workers, 
co operatives, veterans, the poor 
Health Insurance Law (2008; imp 2009); 
Children under 6 years old, near poor. 
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insurance cards increased very rapidly, tripling compared to 2005.  By 2010, the total number of 
poor people who had been issued with health insurance cards was 13.5 million people, accounting 
for approximately 27% of all people with health insurance (see annex C for detailed breakdown of 
numbers insured by population group).  
Figure 3.3 Composition of the Insured (1995-2010) 
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Source:  MoH (2011)  
 
The majority of individuals enrolled in the voluntary scheme are full time students who are 
generally enrolled en masse by the insurance agency who collects contributions at schools or 
colleges. Premiums are paid by the student’s family, and it has been stated that typically there is 
little that is voluntary about the enrolment process (World Bank, 2009). 
3.2.1.3 Coverage by Region 
Health insurance coverage rates vary across the country.  Table 3.6 presents a breakdown by 
region and also includes rates for Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and the provinces with highest 
and lowest cover to illustrate variations.   
Table 3.5 Health Insurance Coverage by region 
Area Population (mns) Insured (n, mns) Proportion (%)  
Viet Nam 86.0 50.1 58.2 
Red river delta 19.6 10.8 55.1 
Midland and northern mountainous 11.1 7.1 64.2 
North and south central coast 18.9 11.4 60.1 
Central Highland 5.1 3.2 63.2 
South East  14.1 8.3 59.1 
Mekong region 17.2 9.2 53.6 
HCMC 7.1 4.6 63.8 
Hanoi 6.5 3.7 57.1 
Bac Kan – High cover 0.3 0.3 96.5 
Pho Tho - Low cover 1.3 0.4 29.0 
Source:  Adapted from MoH (2010) data 
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In the Mekong region 53.5% of the population are enrolled, whereas in the Midland and northern 
mountainous region over 64.2% of the population are covered.  Coverage is higher in HCMC 
(63.8%) compared to Hanoi (57.1%).  At the province level enrolment is highest in Bac Kan 
(96.5%) a province with a very small population, and lowest in Phu Tho province (29%).   
The reasons for differing regional coverage include population characteristics (e.g. numbers of 
poor, near poor, informal, state worker) and also VSS administrative capacity at province and 
district level. 
3.2.2 Premiums and benefit package 
Premiums are set at 4.5% of salary (increased in Jan 2010), pensions or benefits depending on the 
insurance group.  For those not earning a salary (e.g. the poor) the health insurance premium is 
equivalent to 4.5% of minimum salary.  The state paid VND 394,200 (4.5% of the minimum wage) 
per premium in 2010 for the poor (MoH/HPG 2010).  Since 2008, the state budget has also 
subsidized 50% of the health insurance premium for members of near poor households who 
participate in voluntary health insurance, part of the premiums for health insurance of students, and 
the entire premium for children under six years.  Figure 3.5 shows that contributions and subsidies 
from public funds represented 75% of all health insurance revenue in 2010. 
 
Figure 3.4 Proportion of health insurance revenues in 2010 by source of 
contribution 
Proportion of revenues in 2010 by source of contribution
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Source:  Adapted from MoH 2010 data (p.32) 
 
Premiums of individuals enrolled in the voluntary health insurance scheme differ.  In urban areas 
the premium is VND 320,000/person/year and in rural areas it is VND 240,000/person/year. The 
premium for students enrolled in the voluntary health insurance scheme is VND 
120,000/person/year in urban areas and VND 100,000/person/year in rural areas.   
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Benefits are similar for voluntary and compulsory health insurance members. The benefit package 
covers most outpatient and inpatient care received at government facilities.  In addition, some 
health insurance members are now entitled to reimbursement of their transportation costs, in case 
they are referred to a different level of care.  Exclusions include interventions covered by vertical 
programs such as HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs, drugs not on the MOH list, 
treatments not yet approved by MOH, various “luxury” interventions such as cosmetic surgery, 
dental care, treatment of self-inflicted injuries, and treatment for drug addiction. 
For high-tech, high-cost medical services insured patients (except for a few designated insured 
groups) are only entitled to partial refund of the costs by the health insurance agency, with the rest 
to be paid for out of their own pocket.  High health care costs of VND 7 million or more will be 
reimbursed up to 60%, but only to a ceiling of VND 20 million per health service use, with the 
remainder to be paid out of the patient’s pocket to the health service provider. 
People covered by voluntary health insurance pay 20% of the treatment costs (the co-payment is 
eliminated if outpatient care costs are less than VND 20,000). For people who have been covered 
by voluntary health insurance continuously for 24 months or more, the VSS will pay 50% of some 
drugs which are not on the regular list of drugs covered by health insurance, for example some 
drugs for cancer or for prevention of rejection of organ transplants. The amount covered by health 
insurance will not exceed VND 12 million per year.  The poor must pay a 5% co-payment 
(MoH/HPG 2008).  
3.2.3 Factors impacting uptake of health insurance 
The Ministry of Health recently completed a study which assessed some of the key challenges in 
enrolling different groups to health insurance, particularly those working in private enterprises and 
the near poor for which health insurance coverage rates are very low (MoH 2011).  The MoH 
presents enrolment figures for private enterprises in 7 provinces between 2005 and 2008 which 
show that approximately 20% of private enterprises were covering their workers.  Enrolment is 
higher in Hanoi with 30 private enterprises reporting that 60% of workers were covered (MoH, 
2011).  The main issues relating to low enrolment are that private enterprises are either unaware of 
their obligations regarding health insurance for their workers or they evade making contributions as 
the administrative structure for health insurance implementation is weak.  Employees of private 
enterprises do not want to be insured because they consider the premiums to be too expensive; 
the administrative hurdles for accessing treatment once insured are high and take time; the drugs 
included in the benefit package are limited and of poor quality’. 
Efforts to cover the near poor are also proving a challenge and relate to the inability or 
unwillingness to pay for health insurance and also the lack of clear guidelines relating to roles and 
responsibilities for implementing health insurance at the local level.  Feedback from the provinces 
is that the aggregate premium for near poor households is too high, the near poor need to pay 20% 
of health care costs, and services are often some distance away.  Near poor individuals often wait 
until they fall sick, or get defined by the local authority as a “poor household” to get free insurance. 
Whilst some local households wish to purchase health insurance, the premium is too high, costing 
millions dong for a family even with a 50% subsidy (MoH 2011).  Even higher subsidies to the 50% 
near poor have not encouraged large increases in insurance coverage among the near poor.  For 
example, in Ben Tre province, as part of a health sector project over 59,000 cards were purchased 
and the near poor were offered a further 30% subsidy (80% total subsidy) in efforts to enrol them.  
The study found that just over 5% of the near poor purchased cards and the feedback was even at 
20% of the premium the price was too high.  In another province - Tay Nihn - only 1.5% of near 
poor households are currently insured.   
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In 2010, approximately 650,000 near poor people enrolled in health insurance across the country 
(MoH, 2011). In the Mekong region alone, 439,157 near poor were enrolled in health insurance.  
This region is supported by the Mekong Health Support Project which funds communications, 
identification and drawing up lists of near poor households. In addition to the 50% state subsidy, 
the project also subsidies 30% of the premium.  Beneficiaries thus contribute only 20% of the 
premium. According to the roadmap to achieve universal health insurance, according to the Health 
Insurance Law, coverage of the near poor should be implemented starting in 2010. 
Most provinces have not yet prepared master plans for implementation of health insurance as set 
forth in the roadmap. Local authorities argue that implementation of health insurance is the 
responsibility of the health sector and social security, thus expansion of beneficiaries is facing 
enormous difficulties.  A common problem for enrolment is that the agencies responsible for 
implementation do not have clear guidelines for implementation: they do not have lists of near poor 
nor a budget to implement health insurance.  Whilst there is a steering committee for poverty 
reduction at the district level, the Department of Labour, Invalid and Social Affair has not produced 
any guiding documents regarding the process of defining near poor households and therefore 
commune leaders cannot develop lists for implementing health Insurance (MoH 2011).  There is 
also little communication about health insurance. In previous years (up to 2002) health insurance 
was communicated to the community but this is not currently common place. 
Castel’s (2010) simulations indicate that if universal coverage is achieved, the policy that links the 
basic premium for health insurance to the minimum wage (and thus to general income growth) will 
be successful in balancing health insurance finances in 2015 and, probably, in supporting the 
growth of the health sector in the following 5 years. If half the workers in the informal sector do not 
follow the health insurance regulation or if formal employment in the enterprise sector does not 
grow as expected, the revenue shortfall could hit 0.3%–0.5% of GDP. 
 
3.3 Impact of Insurance on access and financial protection 
A number of studies have examined the impact of health insurance on access and expenditures for 
different groups and income categories.  Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009) state that the evidence 
from Vietnam suggests that  insurance reduces the financial risk that people incur, especially large 
amounts of spending over the year, although the effect is small—a reduction in the risk of 
catastrophic spending of 1 percent to 3 percent.  The same authors suggest that, on balance, 
insurance lowers out-of-pocket payments—the higher costs caused by extra utilization are not 
enough to outweigh the lower costs per contact. However, the reduction in out-of-pocket spending 
attributable to insurance is relatively modest (25 percent).  Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009) state 
that this finding is broadly consistent with previous studies, with most finding a limited impact of 
insurance on out-of-pocket payments, the exception being a study of the voluntary program in Hai 
Phong (Jowett et al. 2003) which found a very large impact. Two studies (Wagstaff and Pradhan 
2005; Sepehri et al. 2006a) find an impact in the range -20 percent to -35 percent, and another 
(Trivedi 2003) found a zero impact. A recent study of the scheme for the poor (Wagstaff 2007b) 
also found a zero effect.  Ekman and Bales (2008) conclude from their review of health insurance 
studies that they “provide strong evidence of a positive and causal impact of this type of insurance 
on key policy outcomes”.   
Approximately 30% of poor people with health insurance still encounter catastrophic health 
spending (measured as health expenditures exceeding 10% of non-food expenditures) (MoH/HPG 
2010). This reflects the reality that people with health insurance use health services more, yet 
health insurance does not cover all health care costs, such as purchase of medicines that are not 
on the list covered by health insurance, health care in private facilities, food and transport costs 
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related to health care seeking, etc. Thus, besides expansion of coverage of the population, there is 
a need to pay attention to the depth and height of coverage, increasing the package of benefits to 
reduce out-of-pocket health spending of people with health insurance. The application of 5% co-
payments for poor people with health insurance is also causing difficulties in terms of financial 
access for the poor, especially the poor and ethnic minorities in disadvantaged areas. 
There are concerns that the goal of pooling and risk sharing in the health insurance scheme has 
been affected by the health insurance fund management mechanism in the past few years. People 
with health insurance in some poor or mountainous provinces tend to use health services less (due 
to many factors, including limitations of the health provider system, geographic factors/transport, 
culture, and especially financial ability of the poor to pay fees not covered by health insurance), so 
the health insurance fund in these provinces is in surplus, while the health insurance funds in large 
cities and provinces with more developed socio-economic conditions usually have a severe deficit 
in their health insurance fund. This has led to the health insurance funds in poor areas cross-
subsidizing care for large cities in some provinces (MoH / HPG 2010).  
 
3.4 Moving towards universal coverage 
The passing of the Health Insurance Law in 2008 reaffirmed the goal of universal health insurance 
coverage and laid out the roadmap to reach this goal by 2014.  Table 3.7 provides a breakdown of 
the key groups required to join to achieve the goal of near universal coverage and the numbers 
requiring enrolment.  Approximately 5.6 million workers employed in non-state sector enterprises 
need to be enrolled.  There have been challenges enrolling this group as private enterprises are 
not keen to enrol workers and systems to enrol them are also lacking.  The other key groups 
include the near poor, pupils and students, relatives of employees and farmers and other 
professions working in the informal sector.   
Table 3.6 Breakdown of key groups currently not covered by health insurance in 
Vietnam 
Participants Number in Group (mns) 
Covered by HI 
(mns) 
% covered 
by HI 
Currently not 
covered by HI (mns) 
Enterprises Workers 11.9 6.4 53.4 5.6 
Near Poor 6.1 0.7 11.4 5.4 
Pupils and Students 13.8 9.8 71.1 4.0 
Relatives of employees 6.8 0.0 0.0 6.8 
Informal Sector 11.7 3.9 33.4 7.8 
Total 50.3 20.8 58.7 29.6 
Source:  Adapted from MoH (2010) 
 
Table 3.8 provides a roadmap for group enrolment.  By the end of 2009 all children under six years 
of age should have been enrolled in health insurance.  According to the MoH data there are still 1.9 
million children under six who are yet to be enrolled.  By the end of 2010 5.4 million “near poor” 
and 4 million students require coverage if the roadmap timelines are adhered to.  The final two 
groups - including relatives of employees and farmers/ informal sector workers - totals 14.6 million 
people. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Health Status and Determinants 
 Oxford Policy Management 19 
Table 3.7 Milestones for enrolling specific population groups into health 
insurance 
Year Group to be covered by health insurance 
2009 Children under six years 
2010 Near poor, pupils and students 
2012 People in agricultural, forestry, fishery and salt making households 
2014 Dependents of workers, cooperative members, family enterprises and other groups. 
Source:  MoH 2010 
 
3.5 Lessons from other countries  
International evidence highlights how some countries have attained, or are close to, universal 
coverage.  This section reviews the experiences of Thailand, China and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, focussing on how these countries funded universal 
coverage, implementation challenges, and the impact of insurance coverage on access and health 
expenditures.     
3.5.1 Funding Universal Coverage: Experiences from Thailand and China 
A key policy dilemma is how to fund insurance contributions of those who are not employed in the 
formal sector.  Thailand and China have both had success in expanding coverage to include 
informal workers and their families. Governments in both countries have invested considerable 
resources to attain universal / high levels of coverage.   
 
Thailand provides an important regional example of how universal coverage has been achieved 
with the addition into the scheme of informal sector workers.  The country has three main health 
insurance schemes covering i) civil servants and their dependents (CCS), ii) private sector 
employees and temporary public sector employees (Civil Service Scheme); and iii) population not 
covered by schemes (i) and (ii) (the Universal Health Care Coverage Scheme (UCS)).   Near 
universal coverage has been attained with the expansion of the UCS.  The number of uninsured 
decreased from 20% of the total population in 1998 to 2% in 2007 (Wibulpolprasert and 
Thaiprayoon, 2008).  The UCS currently covers approximately 75% percent of the population with 
a comprehensive package of care, including both curative and preventive care.  An important 
feature of the UCS scheme is the source of funding for enrolees, which is financed solely from 
general tax revenue.  The additional state funding commitment to finance universal coverage is 
evident by the figures which show that government spending on health (as a proportion of total 
spending on health) rose from 56.1% to 73.2% between 2000 and 2007.  It is widely acknowledged 
that political and financial commitment to universal coverage in Thailand was key to its attainment.      
 
China, like Thailand, has three key insurance schemes which in 2008 covered 87% of the 
population and has also moved towards universal coverage in an incremental fashion. The Urban 
Employee-based Basic Medical Insurance scheme (UEBMI) covers 15% of the population, the 
Urban Resident-based Basic Medical Insurance scheme (URBMI) covers 4%, and the New Rural 
Cooperative Scheme (NCMS) covers 68% of the population.  In 2008, nearly 90% of the rural 
population was covered by the NCMS, while 65% of the urban residents were covered by urban 
health insurance schemes. After the NCMS was set up in 2003, its rural coverage expanded 
rapidly, increasing from 8 million in 2003 to 833 million in 2009.  Over the past few years, an 
average of 80% of premiums has been subsidized by the government, with 20% coming from 
individual farmers (Meng and Tang, 2010).   
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The expansion of health insurance in China has been supported by government subsidies through 
a medical assistance program (MFA) for the poor.  Both the NCMS and MFA were introduced in 
2003 and designed to close the health security gap between rural and urban areas and between 
the rich and the poor (Meng and Tang, 2010). Target populations are identified by the county 
(district in urban areas) Department of Civil Affairs in collaboration with community government 
organizations. By the end of 2009 approximately 93 million poor residents were covered by the 
MFA. Government subsidies to the MFA have continuously increased since it was first started. In 
2003, the urban MFA received US$ 31 million from the central government, increasing to US$ 62 
million in 2006. 
3.5.2 Funding Universal Coverage: Experience from the former Soviet Union and 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (FSU/CEE) 
The countries of the FSU/CEE have adopted different approaches towards covering their 
respective populations with health insurance.  In some countries, the eligible nonworking 
population is covered through transfers from central or regional budgets, or from dedicated funds, 
such as employment funds (Slovakia) or pension and unemployment funds (Kyrgyzstan prior to 
2004). In most countries, transfers from the central budget are used, although mechanisms vary 
regarding the basis for calculating these transfers. It is often a matter of budgetary negotiations, 
with governments paying what they deem they can afford.  In Serbia, for example, despite 
contributions on behalf of vulnerable groups being based on the minimum wage, general revenue 
allocations have been based on historic levels and are ad hoc in practice (Kutzin et al., 2010).  
 
In some cases, however, there is a specific liability on the budget that is enforced.  In the Czech 
Republic, for example, there is a monthly central budget transfer for the economically inactive 
population set at 13.5% of the average wage, as defined by the Ministry of Finance. Another 
example is the Republic of Moldova, where the health insurance law specified that the per capita 
contributions from the budget on behalf of state-insured individuals must be equivalent to the 
estimated average per capita cost of the benefits package, leading to annual increases in these 
transfers. Estonia is notable for its near-complete reliance on payroll taxation, with very minor 
transfers to the Estonian Health Insurance Fund for non-contributing individuals entitled to 
coverage, and in Croatia subsidies for the non-working population were made implicitly by 
retroactively covering shortfalls, rather than these being budgeted and paid prospectively. 
 
General revenues continue to play an important role in health system funding, even in many of the 
FSU/CEE countries that rely on payroll tax as the predominant revenue collection mechanism. This 
may take the form of explicit subsidies for the non-contributing population. In the Republic of 
Moldova, over 65% of the funds managed by the National Health Insurance Company (NHIC) took 
the form of transfers from the central budget to cover the premium of defined state-insured non-
contributing individuals. Alternatively, in Kyrgyzstan, the state budget transfers most of the funds 
for health from general revenues to the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) to provide a 
basic package on behalf of the entire population). In addition, payroll taxes exist and central budget 
transfers to the MHIF take place, in order to achieve a complementary contributory entitlement for 
the insured population. Hence, public funding for both the Moldovan and Kyrgyz systems comes 
predominantly from general revenues, although each has something called an “health insurance 
fund”.  In all countries, general revenues also are used to directly fund population-based and public 
health-oriented programmes, such as those for tuberculosis (TB), psychiatric care, human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and substance abuse. 
 
Returning to the Viet Nam context the feasibility of covering the remaining uninsured population via 
government subsidies was explored in a recent World Bank report. Liebermann and Wagstaff (WB, 
2009) estimate the fiscal implications of extending health insurance coverage in Viet Nam to attain 
universal coverage.  The authors put forward an alternative option to the current insurance system, 
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whereby all contributory and non-contributory insurance payments are funded via tax subsidies.  
They explore the fiscal implications of one scenario in which universal coverage is achieved by 
increasing the fiscal deficit (3.8% of GDP to 4.4% of GDP at the time of the study).  Liebermann 
and Wagstaff argue that as (insured) households would spend less on out-of-pocket payments, 
there is a case for raising taxes as a quid pro quo.  
 
3.5.3 Implementing universal coverage:  Experience from Thailand 
Important lessons relating to rapid implementation (investment in infrastructure and human 
resources) need to be considered, and importantly whether the coverage is sustainable in the long 
term.  Following the increase in coverage in Thailand, a survey found that more than 70 percent of 
health personnel claimed that their workload increased as a result of the UCS (WB, 2010).  A 
comparison of service utilization between 2002 and 2007 revealed that the utilization rate of public 
health care services increased more than 20 percent for outpatient care and nearly 20 percent for 
hospital admissions (WB, 2010).  The findings from Thailand suggest that movement towards 
universal coverage requires planned investment in  the health service infrastructure, not least 
health workers; that creating unrealistic expectations and demand amongst the insured needs to 
be avoided; that there is a risk of underestimating the effect of universal coverage on the growth of 
the private sector, particularly those services that cater for the urban rich and the foreign patients; 
and that countries should balance the use of financial incentives to solve the problem of human 
resources for health with  non-financial incentives, like social recognition, and greater fairness in 
personnel management. 
3.5.4 Insurance coverage and financial protection:  Experience from China 
There has been considerable emphasis on extending the breadth5 of health insurance coverage in 
countries across the region, however there are concerns in many countries about the depth and 
height of coverage.  Whilst policy has focussed on the aim of developing a universal risk pool, 
equally important is the nature of cover for those individuals in the risk pool, as there is little point in 
being insured if the benefits are limited and significant additional spending is associated with any 
episode of health care.      
 
Depth of insurance coverage is a current concern in Viet Nam.  Currently, the proportion of total 
health spending sourced from health insurance was 17.6% in 2008 (MoH/ HPG 2010).  Given that 
approximately 58% of the population are covered with insurance, this figure appears very limited, 
suggesting a limited benefit package associated with either compulsory or voluntary health 
insurance.  
Evidence from China suggests that health insurance coverage does not necessarily guarantee 
financial protection for individuals who access health care.  Wagstaff and Lindelow (2005) find 
increased out-of-pocket payments with insurance coverage in China; however they suggest the 
welfare implications of this finding are obvious.  Individuals are likely to weigh any extra risk of 
large out-of-pocket payments against the additional health gains from being able to receive more 
extensive and more sophisticated medical care once insured. The authors state that on balance, 
people may be better off despite facing a higher financial risk.  They add however that if providers 
exploit their informational advantage and take the opportunity of insurance coverage to deliver 
more expensive medical care that the individual would not have chosen, had he been fully aware 
of the magnitude of the additional health benefits and additional out-of-pocket expenses, then the 
welfare gains associated with insurance are less clear. 
                                               
5 height = extent of costs covered; depth = which services included; width = population covered) 
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However in Thailand, Vasavid et al. (2004) reported that household health expenditures decreased 
after UCS implementation.  They find that in 2002 household savings on health care services 
among those currently insured by the UCS were approximately US$253.95 million and a year later 
the figure was US$334.89 million. Evidence from three low-income provinces found that enrolment 
in the UCS would ease the burden on household expenditures only if UCS beneficiaries seek care 
from facilities operated under the UCS. The proportion of people facing catastrophic health 
expenditures was also been reduced significantly from 5.4 percent in 2000 to 2.0 percent in 2006. 
It is also reported that the UCS has also brought at least one million Thais out of poverty. 
3.5.5 Collecting health insurance premiums:  Experience from the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and central and Eastern Europe (FSU/CEE)  
The collection of insurance premiums from those working in private enterprise has been difficult in 
Vietnam.  The VSS has responsibility for collecting revenues as part of its wider collection of social 
security revenues.  There has been a lot of discussion internationally about the best way to collect 
health insurances revenues.  It is insightful to understand how premium collection has evolved in 
the countries of the former Soviet Union and countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  These 
countries have made different choices as to whether to make new purchasing agencies (typically 
compulsory insurance funds) responsible for the collection of dedicated taxes (integrated 
approach), or to have a separate body – typically either the general tax collection agency for the 
country or an agency with specific responsibility for collecting payroll “social taxes” – take on this 
function and then transfer the funds to be pooled by the purchasing agency (functional 
specialization approach). Both approaches have potential theoretical advantages and 
disadvantages.  
In 2001 in the Russian Federation, payroll tax collection for compulsory health insurance was 
shifted from the Federal and Territorial Compulsory Health Insurance Funds to the general tax 
authority. The tax authority collects the “uniform social tax”, which covers payroll contributions for 
health, pensions and other social security items. A specified portion of the uniform social tax is 
transferred to the compulsory health insurance funds. The rationale for this institutional change 
was to streamline the collection of all types of tax within a general budgetary framework to promote 
transparency.  Similarly in Estonia, following years of lobbying by the health insurance agency, 
responsibility for revenue collection was shifted from the health insurance agency to the central tax 
administration. The rationale was that the switch in functional responsibility to the tax 
administration would allow the health insurance agency to focus on purchasing arrangements, or 
expenditure flows.  
Countries have also experienced difficulties with the implementation of the integrated approach. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, collection rates varied from 30% to 84% across health 
insurance funds (each of which was responsible for collecting its own payroll tax), due to such 
factors as different levels of unemployment, the extent of the informal sector and urbanization. 
Overall, the analysis found that only approximately 50% of what could be collected from formal 
sector workers was actually being obtained, and much of this was due to an unclear division of 
responsibilities – despite the apparent responsibility of the health insurance funds for revenue 
collection – for collection and enforcement between the health insurance funds and the general tax 
authority (Sanigest 2005). 
It is recognized that revenue agencies and social security organizations have different 
requirements regarding data needs, record retention, and other related aspects of core processes. 
Also, there are generally differences in taxpayers covered, taxable income bases, and related 
items that must be taken into account. While such differences add complexity to implementation of 
integration projects, they are manageable issues that do not obviate the fact that the core 
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processes are common in both systems even as details may differ.  Placing responsibility for 
collections with the tax administration eliminates duplication of core functions that would otherwise 
occur in the areas of processing, enforced collection of returns and payments, and audit of 
employers.  
Placing responsibility for collections with the tax administration could also significantly reduce 
compliance costs for employers, with less paperwork as a result of common forms and record-
keeping systems, and a common audit program covering VAT, income and payroll taxes, and 
social contributions.  
A careful assessment needs to be made of the readiness of the tax administration to take on the 
new responsibility for collection of social contributions in Vietnam. The tax administration must 
currently have the capacity to take on this new role, or, the transfer should be incorporated into a 
modernization program being undertaken by the tax administration. A tax administration that is not 
well structured, has existing tax collection fragmented across different agencies, is not organized 
with effective processes for collection and audit, has poorly trained staff, and has ineffective 
management, will not be in a position to achieve the significant potential benefits of improved 
collection levels—and any transfer in these circumstances may in fact damage collections in the 
short term. In these cases, integration should be undertaken in conjunction with a modernization of 
the tax administration’s structure and core collection processes. 
3.6 Summary 
No country has yet been able to guarantee everyone immediate access to all the services that 
might maintain or improve their health. They all face resource constraints of one type or another, 
although these are most critical in low-income countries.  Hence whilst countries have moved to 
universal coverage - a key strategic goal - it is important to understand the content and quality of 
coverage.  International evidence shows that most reforms towards universal coverage have been 
gradual. Social health insurance systems, for example, usually start by covering formal sector 
employees and slowly expand to other population groups - often starting with dependents of the 
employees. In most European countries that have achieved universal coverage, the transition took 
place over many decades, often taking more than 50 years.  More recently, in Costa Rica, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, reform took between 20 and 30 years (Kutzin et al., 2010). 
The 2010 Joint annual Health review suggests that three factors will strongly influence Viet Nam’s 
roadmap towards achieving universal health insurance.  These include: 
 The structure of Viet Nam’s workforce. Current targets for the year 2010 envisage that the 
agricultural workforce will account for less than 50% of the total labour force, falling to 30% 
by 2020. The high number of casual rural and urban labourers remaining in 2014-2015 is a 
hindering factor for ensuring participation in the health insurance scheme. 
 Capacity of the state budget: With 40% of the population unable to afford health insurance 
premiums, the state budget needs to fund approximately USD 2.8 billion to ensure their 
health care needs.  
 Trend in development of the public health service delivery: The JAHR stresses the 
importance of regulating hospital autonomy. 
 Strengthened capacity of the health insurance management institution. Currently the health 
insurance system does not yet have software and unique individual ID numbers to manage 
health insured patients, as well as health care costs reimbursed by health insurance. The 
health insurance fund is managed and administered together with other types of funds, 
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such as the pension fund, in the Vietnam Social Security scheme, so there is a lack of 
professional specialization and specific health insurance skills.  
Finally, It is important to note that during the transition process to universal coverage, population 
coverage often remains incomplete and sometimes may even become more unequal, with the 
poorest groups the least likely to be protected and often the last to benefit from extended 
coverage. It is here that existing community, cooperative and enterprise-based health insurance, 
as well as other forms of private health insurance, might have a role to play, protecting as many 
people as possible. 
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4 Purchasing and provider payments 
4.1 Overview 
Providers in Vietnam receive their income from three main sources: the budget, out-of-pocket 
payments by patients, and income from the health insurance agency.  Concerns relating to the 
health policy impact of the current provider payment system relate mainly to the payment of 
hospitals and focus on the efficiency and cost escalation consequences associated with incentives 
introduced by fee for services (health insurance payments and out of pocket payments by patients) 
and norm-based state budgets paid within the context of increasing hospital autonomy.  It is 
argued that the VSS currently plays a very limited role as an informed “purchaser” of health 
services: It acts largely as a passive payer of bills and in any case picks up only 17 percent of total 
health expenditures.  Furthermore, neither VSS nor the states exercise much financial control over 
providers (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009).  
 
Hospital outpatient visits and inpatient admissions have increased by an average of 5 percent a 
year since 1998 (Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009).  Referring to the FFS system, the authors state 
that: “what can safely be said is that insurance in Vietnam has probably encouraged some overuse 
of services, but exactly how much is not known and nor will it be known how much of the increase 
is caused by patients too keen to seek care and how much is due to the provider being too keen to 
deliver care, incentivised by higher revenues”.  Lieberman and Wagstaff (2009),  
The proportion of income hospitals receive from either FFS or the state budget is likely to depend 
on a number of factors and will be determined by the numbers of insured registered with a facility, 
the types of service provided in a facility, the charges for services, and the ability and willingness of 
patients to pay for services.  Informal payments are also prevalent in Vietnam.  In some higher 
level facilities the bulk of funding comes from FFS payments – be they from VSS, the uninsured or 
user charges for services not covered by the VSS.  Conversely, at lower levels of the system 
where insurance uptake has been limited and where patients do not have the ability to pay, the 
bulk of funds will come from state subsidies.   
Over the last past 10 years, the state budget has gradually been reduced as a source of revenue 
for many hospitals, and health insurance income has increased.  As both fee-paying patients and 
health insurance pay providers on a FFS basis, there has been a gradual shift away from budgets 
toward FFS in the hospital sector as insurance coverage increases. 
 
4.2 Strategy and JAHR 2010 implementation recommendations 
A recent decree (62/2009/ND-CP) states that capitation payment should be introduced in all 
primary health care facilities.  Capitation payments have been piloted since 2001, and to date there 
are 43 providers implementing capitation, mainly district general hospitals (MoH/HPG 2010).  The 
2010 JAHR refers to the preliminary results of capitation piloting which highlight that problems 
have been encountered as capitation funds have been significantly overspent in almost all 
hospitals.  Furthermore, average costs of care through health insurance have not fallen, but have 
actually increased for both inpatient and outpatient services.   
Hospital provider payment reforms (case-based payments) are also being implemented on a pilot 
basis at Ba Vi district hospital and Thanh Nhan municipal hospital.  The 2010 JAHR argues that 
further implementation of case-based payments will require investment in hospital costing, the 
application of procedure codes and the adjustment of relative weights for diagnostic groups being 
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used internationally to make them appropriate for the Vietnamese context.  The report also states 
that the Ministry of Health is developing a concrete roadmap for applying case mix payments. 
Forthcoming government policy and implementation documents outline strategies and plans to 
tackle the unintended consequences of the existing system of payments (e.g. MoH Draft Health 
Strategy 2010-2020, MoH/HPG 2010).  Whilst the broad provider payment strategy is defined, 
implementation plans are currently being discussed. Table 4.9 provides the provider payment 
recommendations outlined in the 2010 JAHR document.  
Table 4.8 Provider payment reform recommendations (2010 JAHR) 
Priority Issue Short Term (2011) Long term (2015) Goal by 2011 
Effectiveness in 
allocation and use 
of health financing 
resources 
remains limited 
Develop a roadmap for applying new 
provider payment mechanisms including 
capitation and case-mix.  Research to 
refine the capitation mechanism applied to 
curative care. Strengthen the reporting 
system and analysis of state budget 
reconciliation reports for the health sector 
in order to have accurate information for 
financial planning in the health sector. Set 
up a sectoral reporting system on state 
budget spending for health. 
The Ministry of Health develops 
guidelines for performance based 
state budget allocation in both 
preventive and curative care. 
Bring into full play the role of the 
contracting mechanism for health 
service provider payments. 
Estimate costs for curative and 
preventive care to have a basis to 
estimate cost-effectiveness, and for 
estimation of the resources needed 
to serve as a basis for state budget 
allocation. 
 
Set up a mechanism for monitoring 
and evaluating efficiency and equity 
in allocation and use of state health 
budget spending.  
Share of state health budget 
spent on preventive 
medicine increases. Share of 
state budget spent at the 
district and commune level 
increases. Projects for 
piloting capitation and DRG 
payments to providers in 
place. Set of indicators and 
state budget reconciliation 
report is widely 
disseminated. 
Source:  MoH/HPG 2010 
 
The following section reviews how countries have reformed their provider payment systems and 
attempts to provide insights into some of the important implementation steps that need to be 
considered.  
4.3 International lessons 
4.3.1 Overview of International experience 
The region offers an extensive literature on provider payment reforms.  This section consider how 
countries have approached reform and considers two case studies to illustrate in detail two 
approaches, one from Thailand and the other from Kyrgyzstan.  The section starts with an 
overview of regional experience.  
Many countries (e.g. China, Thailand, Taiwan and Korea) appear to be moving towards mixed 
payment systems which including capitation and case-based payments.  A key message from 
these countries is the incremental approach towards payment reform.  For example in Taiwan, a 
pilot experiment with case payment initially included 28 frequent procedures, such as 
appendicectomy and haemorrhoidectomy and in Korea case payments began with pilot reforms on 
just a few conditions and have subsequently expanded to more conditions and more voluntarily 
participating institutions (Eggleston, 2008).  
Jiujiang (China), one of the original pilot cities for Basic Medical Insurance (BMI), started out using 
FFS to pay hospitals, but in late 1996 switched to a fixed charge per inpatient day, having 
experienced a high rate of growth of medical expenditures under FFS. In 2001, the city switched 
again in an attempt to further stem expenditure growth, this time to capitation.  After the switch to 
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capitation, medical expenditure per insured inpatient fell and the share of drug spending as a 
proportion of total spending fell from 76.5 to 59.8% (Eggleston, 2008).  
Zhenjiang, the other BMI pilot city, started out using a fixed charge per inpatient day, but in 2001 
started to experiment with a diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment method for 82 diseases. 
Rates were fixed – hospitals could retain any savings but bore the loss if actual expenditures 
exceeded the fixed rates. Reimbursement rates for each disease were set according to average 
expenditure incurred over the previous three years in treating the disease in question, less any 
expenditures deemed unreasonable. In 2003, the average expenditure for diseases using DRG 
payment was 25% lower than the province average in the same level hospitals.  In subsequent 
nationwide implementation of BMI, many cities followed the leads of Jiujiang and Zhenjiang in 
switching to payment methods other than FFS. Many have adopted a fixed charge per inpatient, 
but not all. For example, in Guangdong Province in 2002, 13 of the 18 municipal cities used this 
method, two used FFS, two used capitation, and one used a fixed charge per inpatient day 
(Eggleston, 2008).  
The experience from China highlights that case-based payments or DRGs can focus initially on a 
core group of diseases.  One city where evidence has recently emerged of DRGs being used to 
pay insured patients admitted with 13 specific or ‘target’ diseases is Shanghai (Eggleston, 2008).   
DRGs were used in the last three months of 2004 and again in the same period in 2005.  The 
results suggest that the hospital reduced its length of stay during the DRG test periods on patients 
with the target disease (irrespective of whether the patient was insured or not). 
An important point is how to overcome provider reluctance in moving from FFS to case-based 
services.  In Korea generous margins (on average 23.8%) above the FFS reimbursements for nine 
selected services (which together account for 25% of inpatient cases) helped to overcome provider 
reluctance to accept the perceived infringement of professional autonomy.  
In China, some steps have been taken to promote quality and deter misconduct by hospitals or 
other providers. For example, in Qingdao, where a global budget has been used, payments to 
hospitals have been reduced if they admitted fewer than 95% of the number of patients they had 
admitted the previous year (Eggleston, 2008). Some Basic Medical Insurance schemes have set 
up independent quality reviews by expert panels or routine monitoring of high-tech services. Most 
NCMS schemes have also established contracts that specify the package of services providers are 
to deliver, payment methods, quality standards, and other criteria. In some cases, contract with 
providers have included provisions for terminating the contract if, for example, patients were not 
charged in accordance with the established price schedule. 
Some providers in China have of their own initiative moved away from FFS. For example, some 
hospitals have introduced DRGs for fee-paying patients. By the end of 2000, 16 hospitals in 
Ha’erbin had started using DRGs. Since then, similar use of DRG pricing has been reported in 
many other parts of China.  The stated objectives for charging self-paying patients a bundled case 
rate include attracting more business by developing a reputation for transparency in pricing. This 
interesting pricing strategy, undertaken as hospitals compete for patients, might be encouraged 
further by purchasers as providers compete for their insurance contracts.  Arguably the importance 
of this development lies in demonstrating that China can move toward prospective payment even 
while insurance coverage remains far from universal.  
Preliminary evidence suggests that the adoption of DRGs has brought down spending in ways 
consistent with theoretical predictions. In the Red Cross Hospital of Ha’erbin, total expenditures for 
acute appendicitis decreased after implementation of DRGs, and the proportion of drug 
expenditures in total expenditures decreased from 50 to 15%. In Jining Medical College Hospital, 
for the five diseases monitored, total expenditure per case decreased by 30–50% following 
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implementation of DRGs, drug expenditure per case fell by 34–64%, and average length of stay fell 
by 0.4–2 days.  It is unclear how many of these changes stem from the payment reform itself rather 
than other contemporaneous trends.  
In Hainan province the introduction of prospective payment in six hospitals is associated with a 
slower rate of growth of overall expenditures and patient co-payments per inpatient admission, 
compared to FFS (>50% less per admission) (Eggleston, 2004).  Whilst these findings highlight the 
potential benefits of moving towards a prospective system the authors urge caution in 
interpretation since the expenditure decrease could stem from some combination of reduced 
quality of care, risk selection, and cost shifting to the uninsured.  
There have also been some experiences in China with alternative provider payment methods for 
outpatient care. For example, Shanghai’s government insurance program switched to capitation 
payment for outpatient care. While findings indicate a slowdown in spending growth, reform design 
and available data do not permit a rigorous assessment. In many cases, provider payment reforms 
have been introduced in conjunction with other health system reforms, and evaluations have 
focused on the overall impact of the package.  In the rural sector, alternatives to FFS have also 
been tried, although no evidence on impacts appears to exist. In two counties of Xinjiang, the 
county government – through the NCMS fund – paid 40–50 yuan per month to each village 
practitioner. In return, the village doctors provided free diagnosis and treatment, except for certain 
items – such as a delivery – for which they received additional fees.  In Kuanyang township of 
Guizhou Province payment of village practitioners included three parts: a basic salary, an indicator 
based bonus (indicators included the number of home visits and patient satisfaction), and a 
performance-based bonus that included cost containment.   
Within the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe the countries of 
the region typically have implemented a simple per capita payment system for primary care, 
adjusted based on the age and sex composition of the enrolled population and geographic 
differences or some hybrid of the per capita payment for primary care. For example, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina PHC providers are paid a mix of capitation and salary, and in Albania the Health 
Insurance Fund pays a base salary to GPs with a per capita supplement based on location and the 
number of registered patients (Kutzin et al, 2010).  A number of countries have modified the per 
capita payment system to reduce the potential incentive for under-provision of services. In the CE 
countries, for example, PHC providers typically are paid by capitation, with fee-for-service 
payments for preventive and other priority services (Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia). Some countries have included monitoring systems (such as 
Kazakhstan and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) or performance-related payments 
along with the per capita system in order to improve the efficiency incentives of the payment 
system. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia, a portion of the (capitation) rate is paid in the form of 
a bonus if cost containment or health promotion targets are met (Kutzin et al.). 
Most countries of the region have implemented, or are moving toward, case-based hospital 
payment systems (Kutzin et al, 2010).  
4.3.1.1 Implementing DRGs in Thailand 
Initially implemented in 1993, a system of 100 DRGs was created using paper records in 10 
hospitals and focused on injury and emergency care (Bales, undated). In 1995, the set of DRGs 
expanded to 500 groups covering all cases, but still based almost entirely on paper records. In 
1996, researchers began using electronic patient records from hospitals where they were available 
and used “Grouper” software to group diseases such that a diagnostic group consisted of a 
combination of ICD-10 disease code and procedure codes for which the treatment costs were 
similar. In 1997, the Ministry of Health set up an essential minimum data set that they required 
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each hospital to provide in electronic form.  This research formed the basis of establishing the Thai 
DRG relative weights.  
Commencing in 1999, DRGs (500 groups) were used as the basis for topping up the capitation for 
inpatients with severe conditions in a scheme for the poor (later replaced by the UC scheme). In 
2003 when the Universal Coverage Scheme was established, diagnostic groups had expanded to 
1,200 groups, and the DRG payments were applied for severe inpatient cases for which the 
relative weight was over 4. By 2008, there were 1,920 DRGs, and enough evidence had been 
accumulated on disease mix and health seeking patterns to allow estimation of a global budget 
(number of visits times average cost per visit), and to use the relative weights in the DRG to 
allocate this budget across facilities based on their reporting of diagnostic groups treated.  By 
2010, there are more than 2000 DRGs applied to acute, sub-acute and mental illness cases.  
The impact of DRG implementation was carefully monitored. The use of electronic forms of 
information allowed detailed data analysis to identify fraudulent behaviour of providers, to identify 
diseases accounting for a large share of costs that could be prevented, or treated with less 
expensive methods. Initially renal dialysis was not included in the package of services covered by 
insurance, but analysis of household poverty of households with renal failure patients led to the 
decision to find a way to include dialysis into the DRG, but at the same time to find more effective 
ways to prevent renal failure, or less expensive alternatives than facility-based renal dialysis 
(Bales, undated).  
With specific reference to Vietnam, Bales argues that estimation of the capitation amount is not 
complicated, but requires consideration of the frequency of visits, the costs per visit, inflation in 
treatment costs and labour costs.  In addition, there needs to be an objective measure of severe 
illness for which topping up payments can be made to reduce the risk on hospital finances. The 
impact of applying capitation on hospitals, patients, quality of care, and the health insurance fund 
needs to be monitored and evaluated thoroughly so adjustments can be made.   
4.3.1.2 Implementing purchasing reforms in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan used a step-by-step implementation approach and built practical operational capacity 
directly throughout the sequencing of purchasing reforms.  The first step was the implementation 
by the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) of new provider payment systems: a case-based 
system for hospitals (all 66 general hospitals) and a per capita payment system for PHC (all 740 
new Family Group Practices nationwide). For hospitals, the MHIF selected a case-based payment 
system as an initial mechanism aiming towards the restructuring and rationalization of excess 
capacity, and tying payments to services delivered to the population. This approach introduced 
some competition, enabled provider autonomy and facilitated the strengthening of health 
information systems. 
The new case-based hospital payment system was innovative to the extent that it reimbursed 
hospitals for variable costs directly related to patient care, while the government budget continued 
to pay for fixed costs. With the incremental financing from the MHIF, hospitals could finance drugs, 
supplies and food, as well as giving staff bonuses. This led to strong population (especially 
pensioners’) support for health insurance, as co-payments for drugs and supplies could be 
reduced. Limited competition and patient choice emerged, as patients assessed and selected 
hospitals at which drugs, supplies and food were more readily available.  
The natural evolution of the process resulted in health care providers beginning to demand more 
refined provider payment systems. The simple case groups were refined from 108 groups to 139 
groups to improve the fairness of the payment system, which was demanded by the hospitals and 
made possible by the collection of better data, through operation of the system. The information 
system was refined by adding an integrated financial management module. In addition, based on 
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requests from health care providers, changes in labour laws and regulations allowed contracting 
with health care workers and performance-based payment. Steps that were perceived as difficult at 
the onset soon became the demands of health care providers, as the process acquired its own 
momentum. 
Step two came about in reaction to the conflicts between the new payment systems rewarding 
productivity and the former budgeting process with incentives to expand rather than rationalise 
facility capacity. The incentives of the budget system were winning, as they were still driving 
provider decisions. To solve this problem, the MHIF was incorporated under the MoH as an 
independent entity. The MHIF was assigned responsibility for purchasing services with both budget 
funds and payroll tax funds using the new provider payment systems. This approach was piloted in 
two regions in 2001 and rolled out (step-by-step) to be nationally implemented in 2005, and the 
MHIF evolved into a “strategic” health care purchaser by shifting the savings from rationalising the 
hospital sector to PHC, increasing its funding by more than 30%. An outpatient drug benefit was 
also introduced. 
4.4 Purchasing Reforms: the respective roles of the MoH and VSS 
Reforming the delivery system with the aim of containing costs and improving quality is a major 
challenge facing the government. How the health system is best reformed depends crucially on the 
future development of the health insurance system.  Liebermann and Wagstaff (2009) consider two 
reform scenarios for provider payments within the insurance context. The first is a scenario where 
coverage expands toward 100 percent and there is a policy commitment that VSS will fund a large 
proportion of the cost of care. In this scenario, supply-side state subsidies would be largely 
redirected to the demand side in the form of greater tax-financed revenues for VSS. The authors 
argue that in this scenario VSS would exert a significant leverage over providers. It would have a 
strong incentive and a mandate to develop a more rational payment system for providers, as well 
as a quality assurance mechanism that would in itself help to lower costs by curbing unnecessary 
care.  
The second scenario is one which maintains the status quo.  The VSS would cover less than half 
of the population and fund an even smaller share of total health spending. The VSS would be a 
minor payer of health care bills in Vietnam, and would lack the leverage, incentive, or mandate to 
develop new payment methods and quality assurance mechanisms. These tasks would fall to 
MoH. Supply-side subsidies would need to continue in order to keep out-of-pocket payments down 
for the uninsured. Liebermann and Wagstaff argue that payment reform could still occur. The MoH 
could, for example, develop a case-based payment system for hospitals, and this could apply for 
all patients, insured and uninsured. The MoH could pick up a given percentage of the case-based 
payment for all cases (including insured ones) from the state budget. The authors conclude that the 
second scenario suffers from providers facing too many payers, and the limited influence in terms 
of expenditures of the two third-party payers, MOH and VSS.  Payment reform in this scenario is 
likely to be “messier” and less effective and therefore “any strategy of improving provider 
performance must involve moving to a single payer model”.  
4.5 Summary and Lessons 
Much theoretical work suggests that the optimal provider payment system mixes pre-payment with 
some cost reimbursement. Indeed, an optimal payment system almost surely involves mixed levels 
of both supply-side and demand-side cost sharing (Eggleston 2000).  Langenbrunner et al. (WB 
2009) find that a consistent finding from the literature is that mixed provider payment systems are 
necessary to optimally balance multiple objectives such as cost and quality.  The authors find that 
most of the EU 15 countries use fee-for-service for “priority services” such as preventive care and 
Chapter 1: Health Status and Determinants 
 Oxford Policy Management 31 
selected primary care services, and prospective per capita payments for other types of primary 
care. These countries then use prospective payments to set rates and cap expenditures for 
inpatient care services, but adjust for case mix, variations in severity and variations in resource use 
across facilities (Langenbrunner et al. 2009). 
The evidence above highlights that many countries have implemented provider payment reform in 
an incremental fashion (particularly for hospital payments) because of the potentially large effects 
on resource allocation between hospitals relative to historical patterns, and because of the time 
needed to accumulate the data necessary to design more sophisticated payment systems. An 
incremental approach gradually shifts financial risk to hospitals, allowing them time to adapt to the 
new incentives, and provides the opportunity to establish information systems and accumulate the 
data necessary to refine the payment system. 
The review highlights that it is often best to pilot a new payment system first as a safe “paper 
system” without any real change in the flow of funding. This is part of the process of organizational 
learning for both the purchaser and providers, and may help gain the understanding and support of 
key stakeholders. The pilot paper system is useful to model the changes and benefits that will be 
brought about by the new way of working. It also puts the information systems in place and begins 
collecting hospital case data to simulate the changes in resource allocation that will occur in a 
case-based payment system. The paper system can be used to show hospitals how their budgets 
will be affected if the new payment system is introduced, so they can begin to adapt their internal 
management to the new system before facing any actual financial risk. 
After the pilot system, the new payment system may be implemented incrementally in several 
ways. For example, introducing the new system in some hospitals and gradually adding other 
hospitals, or introducing the system in all hospitals in one administrative or geographic area and 
gradually adding other areas; reimbursing a subset of hospital costs through the system initially 
and gradually increasing the types of costs reimbursed; reimbursing a subset of cases on a per 
case basis initially and gradually including other types of cases; introducing hospital-specific 
adjustors to the base rate to maintain historical allocation between hospitals and gradually shifting 
to a single base rate for all hospitals in the system. 
If Vietnam does intend to move towards a DRG system it might make sense to take a DRG system 
that has been developed for another country and modify it to the Vietnamese setting (Liebermann 
and Wagstaff 2009).  This is also the case for other payment systems such as capitation.  Over 
time, as clinical pathways are developed in Vietnam, the DRG rates could be modified accordingly. 
Finally it is worth highlighting that whilst critics often highlight the limitations of simple case 
payment arrangements, simplicity can be a virtue (Eggleston 2008). The administrative costs of 
complex payment mechanisms can outweigh their nuanced incentive benefits, especially when 
only basic informational and managerial infrastructure supports implementation. 
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5 Service Delivery 
5.1 Review of current public and private provision 
Recent documents provide detailed assessments of the health delivery system in Vietnam 
(MoH/HPG 2010; Liebermann and Wagstaff, 2009).  In summary, the tiered structure of health 
care, reaching down to the commune level has helped to ensure broad coverage of preventive 
interventions and access to basic curative interventions for the bulk of the population.  There are a 
total of 10,866 commune health stations covering 98.6% of all communes/wards throughout the 
country. Health workers are operating in 99,409 villages throughout the country accounting for 
84.4% of all villages (MoH/HPG, 2010).  Grassroots healthcare consists of the district, commune 
and village levels and has been identified as a priority because it is the level of care closest to the 
people, and is easiest to access in terms of finance and geography. Almost all districts have district 
general hospitals and some areas also have regional polyclinics or regional maternity clinics.  It is 
stated that increased use of the delivery system is responsible for impressive recent achievements 
in reducing mortality at all ages, and for bringing age-adjusted mortality rates on par with those of 
Malaysia, a much richer country (Liebermann and Wagstaff, 2009) . 
Table 5.10 shows the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people by region in 2008, which stood at 
16.9 beds/10,000 people nationally, higher than the average in other low-income countries (12) 
and middle income countries (16) - higher than Indonesia (6), and the Philippines (13), yet lower 
than Thailand (22) and China (22) (MoH/HPG, 2010).   
Table 5.9 Availability of curative care services by region, 2008  
 Hospital beds /10 000 
people 
Medical workers / 10 000 
people 
Total 16.9 28.6 
Red River Delta 15.5 23.3 
Northeast 18.4 32.2 
Northwest 19.4 38.0 
North Central Coast 14.3 24.9 
South Central Coast 17.0 26.9 
Central Highlands 13.9 27.1 
Southeast 23.4 29.2 
Mekong River Delta 14.3 22.8 
Source: MoH/HPG (2010) 
The government is promoting private sector development (MoH/HPG, 2010).  Thuan et al. (2008) 
find that use of private facilities in Vietnam is common and that patients tend to use private 
services before accessing state care. To date, the country has 74 private hospitals with a total of 
5,600 beds (accounting for just over 3% of the total hospital beds nationally), over 30,000 private 
clinics, and over 21,600 private pharmacies. In addition, 22 private hospitals have been licensed 
and are being constructed. In order to promote development of private health care services, the 
Government has directed localities to prioritize private health facilities through allocation of land for 
development, setting more favourable tax rates, providing investment credit, and ensuring greater 
equity between the public sector and private sector in the public recognition of service and training 
of health staff (MoH/HPG, 2010). 
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5.2 Hospital autonomy 
Since 2002, the implementation of the policy financial autonomy in state hospitals has led many 
hospitals to diversify the forms of health services they provide.  Joint ventures and business 
collaborations have led to the purchase and upgrading of medical equipment, especially high tech 
equipment which has been welcomed by providers within the context of state funding constraints.  
A recent study found that in most hospitals, the number of items of medical equipment valued at 
more than VND 10 million is now considerably higher than before the financial autonomization 
policy was introduced (MoH/HPG 2008).  The 2008 Joint annual Health review states that up to 
2008 the government reported that public hospitals raised approximately VND 3 trillion for 
investment in high technologies.  The extent and form of investment vary considerably between 
hospitals. Hospitals with a high level of financial autonomy often rely on joint ventures and 
business collaborations in which the investor installs the equipment at the hospital and the two 
sides share profits or Build Operate Transfer (BOT)6 arrangements to obtain new and high tech 
equipment. 
There are concerns relating to the inadequacy of existing guidelines relating to hospital autonomy 
policy.  Feedback from health facilities indicates that the lack of concrete guidelines creates 
confusion for public hospitals when implementing joint ventures or business collaborations for use 
of medical equipment. Some of the confusion is related to the extent and scope of their financial 
autonomy and right to enter joint ventures or business collaborations related to equipment (types of 
equipment as well as profit share allowed) (MoH/HPG 2008).  The 2008 JAHR states that many 
believe that the Government should invest using a more uniform approach to modernizing public 
hospitals through use of state budget and other legitimate resources. At the same time, there is a 
need for policy to strongly promote the development of private hospitals, to overcome the mixing 
up of public and private assets. This is a problem that should continue to be evaluated in greater 
depth and comprehensiveness. 
Another issue of concern comes from findings of an assessment of medical equipment in a sample 
of provincial general hospitals, which indicated that about 20% of medical equipment was not used 
to full capacity. This implies that effectiveness in the use of funding through social mobilization is 
not high as reflected in the uncoordinated investment in equipment, sometimes exceeding actual 
demand, or lack of coordination in training (MoH/HPG 2008).  Finally, because hospital managers 
have received little management training, the methods used to create incentives and ensure 
supervisory monitoring have not been used well between the equipment operators and clinical 
practitioners (resulting in an even greater need to overuse diagnostic equipment to compensate for 
losses).  
In summary there are various concerns over the increasing trend towards hospital autonomy.  
Given the profit motive underpinning private investment, concerns relating to over-servicing and 
increased costs to patients are well founded and the public private partnerships currently in place 
require care scrutiny to assess whether they align with broader health policy objectives related to 
equity, efficiency and sustainability.   
 
 
                                               
6 The investor builds and operates the facility (or piece of equipment) for a certain period of time and 
on expiration of the investment period, transfers, without refund, the facility (or piece of equipment) to 
a public service facility. 
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5.2.1 International experience:  Public private partnerships 
Public-private partnerships can take many forms, each with a different degree of private sector 
responsibility and risk (Table 5.11). These are differentiated most critically by whether the private 
firm manages medical services, owns or leases the facility, employs the staff, and finances and 
manages capital investments. A government’s decision on the most appropriate option will depend 
on the hospital’s needs and circumstances, the government’s capacity to regulate and effectively 
control the quality of care, and the public consensus on the need for reform.   
Table 5.10 Options for private participation in hospitals 
No. Option Private sector responsibility Public sector responsibility 
1 
Co-location of private 
wing within or beside 
private hospital 
Operates private wing (for private 
patients).  May provide only 
accommodation services or clinical 
services as well. 
Manages public hospital for 
public patients and contracts 
with private wing for sharing joint 
costs, staff, and equipment. 
2 Outsourcing nonclinical support services 
Provides nonclinical services 
(cleaning, catering, laundry, 
security, building maintenance) 
and employs staff for these 
services 
Provides all clinical services 
(and staff) and hospital 
management. 
3 Outsourcing clinical support services  
Provides clinical support services 
such as radiology and laboratory 
services. 
Manages hospital and provides 
clinical services 
4 
Outsourcing of 
specialised clinical 
services 
Provides clinical support services 
(such as lithotripsy) or routine 
procedures (cataract removal) 
Manages hospital and provides 
most clinical services 
5 Private management of public hospital  
Manages public hospital under 
contract with government or public 
insurance  fund and provides clinical 
and nonclinical for services. May 
employ all staff. May also  be 
responsible for new capital 
investment, depending on terms of 
contract. 
Contracts with private firm for 
provision of public hospital 
services, pays private operator 
for services provided, and 
monitors and regulates services 
and contract compliance.   
6 
Private financing, 
construction, and 
leaseback of new 
public hospital  
Finances, constructs, and owns 
new public hospital and leases it 
back to government   
Manages hospital and makes 
phased lease payments to 
private developer. 
7 
Private financing, 
construction, and 
operation of new public 
hospital  
Finances, constructs, and 
operates new public hospital and 
provides non-clinical oe clinical 
services or both 
Reimburses operator annually 
for capital costs and recurrent 
costs for services provided. 
8 Sale of public hospital as going concern  
Purchases facility and continues to 
operate it as public hospital under 
contract.  
Pays operator for clinical 
services and monitors and 
regulates services and contract 
compliance. 
9 Sale of public hospital for alterative use 
Purchases facility and converts it 
for alternative use, depending on 
sales agreement. 
Monitors conversion to ensure 
adherence to contractual 
obligations.  
        Source:  Taylor and Blair, 2007 
The following case studies provide an international perspective on public private partnerships for 
hospitals specifically, although it should be noted that PPPs cover a broad range of non-hospital 
services. 
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In northeast Brazil the Bahia state government entered into contracts with private firms for the 
management of 12 new public hospitals, constructed and financed by the government. The 
government’s aim was to increase efficiency, improve quality, and transfer operational risk. The 
private operators recruit the staff and manage the facilities (including all medical services) under 
annual funding contracts that can be extended for five years. The operators must treat all public 
patients who come to the hospitals. The government pays for the medical services based on a 
target volume of patients. The operators must achieve 80 percent of the target to receive payment 
but are not reimbursed for volumes above the target. Nevertheless, they have routinely exceeded 
the target by 30 percent (Taylor and Blair, 2007). 
In Australia the government selected a private operator to design, build, own, and operate a new, 
153-bed hospital under a 15-year contract (Mildura hospital contract). The existing public hospital 
was closed, and its employees transferred to the new hospital. The operator must provide 
appropriate clinical services to all patients who come to the hospital without charging them. The 
provider receives from the government annual payments based on the forecast mix of clinical 
patients (with funding capped at a specified number of patients) plus a small block grant to cover 
such costs as teaching. For quality control purposes, the provider is required to maintain the 
hospital’s accreditation (by an independent agency), provide monthly reports on clinical indicators, 
and have high-volume treatments reviewed by external peers. The contract includes penalties for 
noncompliance (including the ultimate sanction, “step-in rights” for the government). And it requires 
the operator to provide a performance bond of about 5 percent of its annual revenues. Mildura’s 
results have been impressive. Capital costs for the new hospital came in 20 percent below those 
for public sector comparators, and the hospital provides clinical services at lower cost than 
government-operated hospitals. Moreover, all performance targets have been met, patient volumes 
increased by 30 percent in the first year, and the operator made a profit (Taylor and Blair, 2007). 
The U.K. government has used public-private partnerships in financing, construction, and facility 
management for many public hospitals over the past decade. Under its programme a regional 
health district tenders for a private firm to finance and construct a new hospital, maintain the 
facility, and provide nonclinical services such as laundry, security, parking, and catering. The 
operator receives annual payments for 15–25 years as reimbursement for its capital costs and its 
recurrent costs for maintenance and services. In this model of public-private partnership, unlike 
those adopted in Australia, Brazil, and Sweden, the public sector remains responsible for all 
medical services (Taylor and Blair, 2007). 
To be continued – the need for public sector negotiation and contracting skills, ability to set and 
monitor performance standards, information on cost structures, as well as private sector capacities. 
Should we make a judgement about how far these preconditions are fulfilled in VN? 
5.3 Retention and remuneration of health workers 
The overall supply of health workers in Vietnam (0.56 doctors per 1,000 population, 0.77 nurses 
and 0.3 pharmacists) is close to the Southeast Asian average but below the regional averages for 
Western Asia. In comparison with the Africa region, it has more than twice as many doctors per 
population and five times as many pharmacists, but fewer nurses. The main challenge is the 
distribution of health staff. Its urban population accounts for 27% of total national population but the 
majority of university pharmacists (82%), doctors (59%), and nurses (55%) work in urban areas. 
Remote areas – such as the Northern Uplands provinces or Central Highlands – have fewer health 
workers per capita, relative to Ministry of Health (MOH) staffing norms, and relative to funded 
positions. In Lai Chau province, for example, only 3% of community health stations have a doctor, 
while in Dien Bien the proportion is 16%, 22% in Son La and 24% in Cao Bang (all remote 
provinces). The shortage is also severe for highly skilled cadres and district level facilities. For 
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example, only 23% of medical staff are graduates in the Central North coastal area (the rest having 
secondary education or less) (Witter et al. 2010).  
 
Witter et al. highlight the complexity of funding sources for doctors in Vietnam, and the extent to 
which these work against retention at lower levels has been (Witter et al, 2010).  The authors 
argue that four typical ‘directions of travel’ are identified for Vietnamese doctors – from lower to 
higher levels of the system, from rural to urban areas, from preventive to curative health and from 
public to private practice. Substantial differences in income from formal and informal sources all 
reinforce these preferences. While non-financial attributes are also important for Vietnamese 
doctors, the scale of the difference of opportunities presents a considerable policy challenge. 
Significant salary increases for doctors in hard-to-staff areas are likely to have some impact. 
However, addressing the differentials is likely to require broader market reforms to control some of 
the exploitative informal charging practices, as well as regulatory measures which mandate a 
period of rural practice as a necessary step on the path to public employment and promotion. 
  
5.4 Clinical Guidelines 
Clinical guidelines have the potential to improve quality of care for inpatients and ambulatory care 
patients. But they also have the potential to reduce costs by curbing unnecessary care. A multi-
country systematic review of the effect of using clinical pathways on length of stay (LOS), hospital 
costs and patient outcomes found that clinical pathways appeared to be effective in reducing LOS 
and costs Rotter et al. (2008).   
In 2007 and 2008, the Department of Health worked with senior clinical colleagues from the NHS 
and Royal Colleges to develop condition-based (and symptom-based, where appropriate) 
commissioning pathways for each of the highest volume specialties reflecting national good 
practice, in order to challenge existing practice, utilise service improvement tools and techniques, 
maximise opportunities for transformational change, provide a catalyst for local discussion and 
challenge, support commissioners to deliver local services within maximum waiting times and 
improving patient experience of their care pathway (DoH).  These were developed for cardiology, 
pain management, ENT, dermatology and other service areas. 
The Ministry of Health in Vietnam has developed and issued more than 1,000 technical guidelines 
for hospitals.  Clinical guidelines can lead to improved health care, but many guidelines are not 
effectively implemented (Livesy and Noon, 2007). 
In February 2010, the Minister of Health issued a decision to set up a steering committee to 
compile treatment guidelines in order to promote more rapid development of up-to-date treatment 
guidelines for each disease.   
Detecting noncompliance is difficult with typical clinical guidelines, which are usually lengthy 
documents that are not always easy to follow. Clinical pathways can be used as they are a simpler 
document. Pathways are a simple document—a single form that shows the steps to be taken 
treating a patient with a given diagnosis and how soon after admission the steps should be taken. 
Clinical pathways thus provide considerable scope for operationalizing clinical guidelines in a way 
that facilitates transparency in the relations between providers and patients, and providers and 
payers. They have been used in a number of countries, including other transition economies and 
Asian health systems.  A study, for example, of the introduction of a clinical pathway for 
transurethral prostatectomy in a Taiwanese hospital found that after the introduction of the 
pathway, mean length of stay and admission charges both fell, in part due to a reduction in 
laboratory tests and drugs.  
Chapter 1: Health Status and Determinants 
 Oxford Policy Management 37 
Clinical pathways are being developed specifically for Vietnam by the MOH, with technical 
assistance by experts in the field and funding from the international donor community. To date, 
work on pathways has started for only a few diagnoses. The approach has been a bottom-up 
consultative process involving just a few large hospitals in Vietnam, and as yet there does not 
appear to be consensus on what the definitive Vietnamese clinical pathway for these conditions 
should look like. While this consultative approach has the merit of ensuring maximal buy-in from 
hospitals, it has the disadvantage of being slow. At this rate, it will be decades before Vietnamese 
pathways are available for the conditions that account for the bulk of hospital inpatient admissions.  
It might make sense, therefore, to begin with pathways developed in other countries, and have 
committees of experts (including representatives from senior hospital management) adapt them to 
the Vietnamese setting. It is also important that VSS be involved in the process, so that it can start 
to develop a pathway-based auditing system.   
5.5 Health Technology Assessment and Priority setting 
One main challenge for health care systems is that resources are limited, making it impossible to 
provide everyone with every effective intervention they might need or want. Scarcity raises 
questions of justice and efficiency: how should limited health care resources be allocated? What 
health services should be publicly funded? How should indications for particular interventions be 
defined.   
There has been an increasing demand for technology, especially in relation to medical devices, 
due to increasing awareness of the availability of technology among healthcare providers and the 
public and increasing competition among private hospitals. 
5.6 Pharmaceutical Pricing Regulation 
Drugs account for a very high share of total spending in Vietnam. According to National Health 
Accounts data in 2007, total spending on drugs was VND 28.4 billion.  In constant prices this is 
equivalent to a doubling of drug spending between 2000 and 2007.  Drugs account for 40% of total 
health spending. Per capita drug spending has increased rapidly reaching a level of USD 17 per 
capita per person in 2008.  
The Drug Administration of Vietnam collaborates with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Industry in its responsibility for implementing and setting up regulatory mechanisms to control drug 
prices. The State uses drug price stabilization methods in the market to respond to the need for 
drugs to serve care, protection and promotion of the people’s health.  Facilities supplying drugs 
must implement all guidelines on price declaration and price re-declaration, posting prices and sale 
prices of drugs. State agencies in charge of managing drug prices (Drug Administration of Vietnam 
and Provincial Health Bureaux) are responsible for considering the reasonableness of drug prices, 
not for approving drug prices declared or re-declared by suppliers.  Management of drug prices is 
decentralized with price management at the central level and in each locality.  
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Figure 5.5 Drug & medical services and general consumer price index, 2000- 2009 
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To be continued: The mechanism for pharmaceutical procurement needs adjustments to ensure 
lower drug prices, while strengthening checking and monitoring of the tendering process for drugs 
in hospitals 
5.7 Lessons 
Hospital autonomy Pharmaceutical pricing Clinical pathways Public private partnerships 
To incorporate: 
Human resources for health, Infrastructure Planning, Rebalancing primary and hospital sectors, 
Quality assurance, Regulation of the health care market 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Vietnam has moved swiftly in the last two decades from an integrated, tax-funded health system 
towards an insurance-based model with provider payments based largely on fee for service. A 
range of issues are thrown up by the current situation, many of them interconnected. Some of the 
most important challenges currently facing health financing in Vietnam include: 
 How to enrol the remaining hard-to-reach populations into health insurance 
 How to ensure that health insurance provides an adequate degree of financial protection for its 
members, especially the vulnerable groups 
 How to dovetail funding from budgetary sources and health insurance to ensure adequate 
resources  and appropriate incentives for facilities and health staff 
 How to modify payment systems to encourage rational, effective, high quality care while 
constraining cost escalation 
 How to regulate providers, public and private to achieve equity, efficiency and quality of health 
outcomes 
In relation to these challenges, experiences in neighbouring countries and countries further afield 
can provide useful lessons, not just on reform directions but on implementation steps and 
sequencing. This report has tried to draw out some of these. They are summarised here in a 
number of recommendations. 
6.1 Risk pooling: moving towards universal coverage and effective 
financial protection 
Challenge 
The Government has set an ambitious target of 2014 for attaining universal coverage and it has 
also laid out a roadmap for the inclusion of groups into the scheme.  Currently 36 million people 
are without insurance and the main groups to be enrolled include the near poor (5.4 million), 
informal workers (7.8 million), dependents of workers (6.8 million), students and pupils (4 million) 
and workers in private enterprises (5.6 million).  The review highlights a number of reasons why 
insurance for these groups is not purchased, including inability or unwillingness to pay for 
insurance, but also importantly a lack of implementation guidelines and motivation at lower levels 
to collect premiums.   
The government has attempted to make health insurance affordable for vulnerable and priority 
groups.  Health insurance is free for the poor and subsidised by at least 50% for the near poor.  
However it appears that at the household level the aggregate total premium is still too high for 
many households, even with the reduced premium for households with large families.  Even for 
individuals and their families employed in the informal sector the evidence suggests that premiums 
are high (MoH, 2011).  Currently premium levels for the voluntary insured differ according to 
whether a person lives in an urban (VND 320,000/person/year) or rural area (VND 
240,000/person/year).  Whilst large families receive reductions in premiums, the total amount per 
year for a large family could be over 1 million VND.   
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Enrolment of private enterprises into the compulsory scheme is also proving problematic.  The 
VSS is unable to effectively enrol this group with companies easily able to evade registering their 
employees.  Discussions with central and local stakeholders suggest that the VSS does not have 
the resources to effectively seek out and enforce compulsory insurance for this group.  
Furthermore there does not appear to be strong sponsorship at province and central levels to 
enable and support the VSS in their health insurance role.  The international literature highlights 
the importance of strong sponsorship at a high level to ensure local level implementation.    
Continuing high rates of out of pocket payment and catastrophic payments suggest that increasing 
health insurance, while an important component, will not be sufficient on its own to provide 
financial protection for the population. 
Recommendations 
 There is an urgent need to develop detailed plans and projected resource requirements for 
insurance expansion at province level up to the end of 2014.  This analysis will be important to 
manage expectations regarding health insurance coverage uptake.  How feasible is universal 
coverage by 2014?  The international literature highlights that the bulk of those currently 
without insurance in Vietnam are notoriously difficult to enrol and hence considerable effort and 
resources will be required to increase coverage of the remaining groups.  Whilst the   Ministry 
of Health has undertaken some initial exploratory work with provinces to understand the 
feasibility of reaching universal coverage by 2014 (MoH, 2011), it is important to quantify the 
resource requirements needed for the VSS to manage the process over the period up to 2014.  
Some analysis of expected enrolment using different implementation tactics should be explored 
further.  There are likely to be initial investment costs associated with enrolment coupled with 
recurrent costs.  The development of annual business plans and annual reports outlining 
projected coverage should be encouraged.     
 The experience from Thailand and China shows that increasing state subsidies can provide the 
impetus towards achieving universal coverage.  Currently, the bulk of funding for insurance 
comes from general taxes paid into state budget and passed to the VSS (75%).  The costs of 
subsidising universal coverage have been estimated in a recent World Bank study (Liebermann 
and Wagstaff, 2009).  An updated analysis of the feasibility of covering the remainder of the 
population via the state budget and the fiscal implications of this approach should be produced 
in alignment with the proposed roadmap for achieving universal coverage.   
 Clear guidelines should be produced for roles and procedures for identifying the near poor at 
the provincial level. 
 Once the resource implications of enrolling the remaining groups have been elaborated, 
funding mechanisms should be agreed for each province. Vietnam might want to adapt from 
the approaches used in some FSU countries. In the Czech Republic, for example, there is a 
monthly central budget transfer for the economically inactive population set at 13.5% of the 
average wage. Another example is the Republic of Moldova, where the health insurance law 
specified that the per capita contributions from the budget on behalf of state-insured individuals 
must be equivalent to the estimated average per capita cost of the benefits package. 
 Support should be given to each province to develop an action plan, which starts from a 
problem diagnosis (who is uncovered and why). Factors depressing demand for health 
insurance need careful discussion at each level, and actions to address them. If the service is 
perceived as cumbersome or of low quality or inaccessible, then clearly voluntary membership 
will remain low. 
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 For private companies, a carrot and stick approach might be adopted, with companies enrolling 
their employees on a regular and comprehensive basis given a discount (and those resisting 
facing some form of sanction, such as a fine). 
 Since 2003 the VSS has been responsible for collecting premiums for private sector enterprise 
workers and this has proved problematic, as witnessed by the low number of private enterprise 
workers currently enrolled in health insurance.  Alternative mechanisms for premium collection 
should be considered, including the use of the existing tax collection system.  This has been 
successful in a number of the FSU countries, such as Estonia. An analysis of the efficiency of 
existing VSS premium collection needs to be undertaken and a review of alterative premium 
collection mechanisms should be undertaken.  
 Vietnam should learn from the experience of countries where high coverage has achieved 
significant reductions in household spending. Thailand is one such example where expanded 
coverage has also included a strategic allocation of resources to levels of health facilities that 
are better accessed, especially by the poor. In the Thai health system context, DHS is the most 
crucial strategic hub to perform comprehensive and integrated services covering curative, 
prevention and promotion services. 
6.2 Reforming provider payments 
Challenge 
Providers currently receive payments and budgets from three main sources – the VSS in the form 
of fee for service payments, the state budget (norm-based budgets) and fee for service from 
patients.  This provides incentives to providers which are not aligned with public interest and which 
are hard to control. The combination of FFS and norm-based budgets has been described as a 
“toxic mix” of incentives (WB, 2010).  The reform of this system is a priority to improve efficiency 
and control cost escalation.     
Recommendations 
 A strategic decision needs to be made whether the longer term goal is to unify purchasing into 
a single payer (the VSS), with the MoH refocusing on policy setting and market regulation. This 
will have implications for the process of implementation of provider payment reform and for the 
development of the relationship between the MoH and the VSS. One model for integrated 
purchasing might be Kyrgyzstan, where the state budget transfers most of the funds for health 
from general revenues to the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) to provide a basic 
package on behalf of the entire population. In addition, payroll taxes are transferred to the 
MHIF, in order to achieve a complementary contributory entitlement for the insured population. 
 Considerable capacity building of the VSS will be needed if it is to be effective as an active 
purchaser of the bulk of health care services. 
 If Vietnam moves towards a single payer, based on real costs of care, then user fees should be 
reformed, set either as a small fixed amount (co-payment) or proportion (co-insurance) of each 
treatment. Other informal and supplementary payments should be eliminated. 
 Vietnam should move gradually towards the payment mix which many other countries have 
adopted, which includes capitation payments for primary care, case-based (or DRG) payments 
for hospital care, and target payments for some high-priority and preventive services.  
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 The new payment systems should be monitored in relation to quality of care and cost control. 
They should be based on real costs and linked to rational care guidelines (see below). These 
could be incorporated in service contracts as such as those used in Kyrgyzstan which monitors 
prescribing practice for conditions such as hypertension (Kutzin et al, 2010) 
 Based on the international evidence on provider payment reform, an incremental approach to 
reform is recommended, based on the piloting currently underway. An incremental approach 
gradually shifts financial risk to hospitals, allowing them time to adapt to the new incentives, 
and provides the opportunity to establish information systems and accumulate the data 
necessary to refine the payment system. In many countries there is an incremental inclusion of 
hospitals, diseases covered, and also an incremental inclusion of costs included in the 
payment as the system involves.    
 As with insurance coverage, it will be important to develop a more detailed plan for provider 
payment reform at the national level and the development of implementation guidelines at the 
province level. Even if piloted approaches are successful, they will not automatically be 
adopted by all providers. Some form of transitional benefits may be needed to encourage 
adoption (as used in South Korea, where a generous margin was allowed at the time of 
switching from fee for service). The benefits to providers of simpler and more transparent 
charging can be emphasised. A study tour to areas of China which have successfully reduced 
costs through provider payment reform might help to convince hospital managers. 
 Reform of pay for providers, and its streamlining, must ultimately be accompanied by 
streamlining of pay for medical staff, who currently draw on a wide range of sources, formal 
and informal, which again creates mixed incentives in terms of patient care.     
 Provider payment reform is one tool which can be used to improve the balance in the 
Vietnamese system between hospital and primary care – the former being over-utilised at 
present and the latter under-utilised. Management of the growing burden of NCDs can best be 
handled at primary level, and payment systems for providers and staff can incentivise this 
work, and reduce the flow of patients and staff to hospitals. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, a portion of the (capitation) rate is paid in the form of a bonus if cost containment or 
health promotion targets are met. The case of Kyrgyzstan is also instructive, where payment 
reform was used as a tool for addressing over-capacity in hospitals, and generating savings to 
reinvest in primary care. 
6.3 Managing and regulating the health care market 
Challenge 
With the growth in the private sector and the increasing autonomy given to public hospitals in 
Vietnam, there is an urgent need for the MoH to develop regulatory tools to ensure that services 
meet public goals, including delivering appropriate, high quality, cost-effective services. 
Whilst the promotion of hospital autonomy has resulted in the attraction of private investment into 
the sector, there are concerns that current implementation is encouraging investment in expensive 
technologies that yield revenues for the hospital but may not necessarily be required on clinical 
grounds.  Whilst it appears that strategy and implementation guidelines for private investment are 
elaborated, there appears in practice to be considerable flexibility on private investment in 
hospitals. 
The current process of the development and use of clinical guidelines (also known as treatment 
protocols / treatment pathways) requires review.  There are literally hundreds of guidelines 
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developed, however it is very difficult to locate copies of guidelines and understand how they are 
used.   
Recommendations 
 The experience of other countries in relation to health technology assessment should be 
studied. In particular, there needs to be an agency which assesses new technologies both 
prospectively (when should the specific technology be used?) and retrospectively (i.e. how did 
the technology impact decisions on patient care). This would be linked to licensing of 
technology for use in specific settings. 
 The ability of clinicians and managers to profit from private investment in equipment produces 
a conflict of interest and should be forbidden, with appropriate sanctions applied for any 
infringement. 
 Linked to a streamlined purchasing function, the use of a limited number of core clinical 
guidelines (focussed initially on the most common conditions) should be reinforced. The 
process of their production should be speeded up, simplified and they should be widely 
disseminated. Payments should be based on and costed on the basis of compliance with the 
guidelines. Experience from China and Taiwan suggest that considerable cost savings can be 
generated through increased use of clinical guidelines. 
 A range of quality control measures should be developed, including accreditation of all 
providers and the piloting of clinical auditing. Borrowing from China’s experience, independent 
quality reviews by expert panels or routine monitoring of high-tech services could be 
considered.  
 Patient voice should also be encouraged to report any abuses, including poor conduct and 
over-charging. 
 The mechanism for pharmaceutical procurement needs to be reformed to ensure lower drug 
prices, while strengthening checking and monitoring of the tendering process for drugs in 
hospitals. 
 Experience of contracting services from the private sector could gradually be developed in 
Vietnam, using experiences from countries like Australia. The contracting skills developed in 
the process can be applied to public and private sector alike, particularly if the current trend 
towards autonomisation of public hospitals continues. 
 The balance of investments in primary versus hospital care need to be reviewed. A recent 
analysis (Wagstaff and Bredenkamp, 2011) found that only 2.5% of government spending was 
received by CHC and polyclinic level, compared to 97.5% by hospitals. This reinforces the 
need to rebalance the system. 
. 
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Annex A Terms of reference 
TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) 
 
Research paper on “Strategic Options for Financing Health System Modernization and 
Development: what can Viet Nam learn from international experiences?” 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
In an attempt to support Viet Nam to review implementation of the Socio-Economic Development 
Strategy (SEDS) 2001 – 2010 and formulate SEDS 2011 – 2020, MPI and UNDP have jointly 
developed “Support for the Formulation of Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2011-2020” 
project. The project will provide technical assistance to the Drafting Team – and hence the Sub 
Committee for the formulation of SEDS -- to (i) analyse and assess the development situation of 
the country comprehensively and (ii) propose to the Sub Committee strategic development 
directions and options for the nation for the next ten years. The project plans to conduct a number 
of studies in 2009. One of the planned studies is a research paper (with its presentation to the Sub 
Committee’s SEDS 2011-2020 Drafting Team) on “Strategic Options for Financing Health System 
Modernization and Development: what can Viet Nam learn from international experiences?”. The 
project is seeking an international institution/sub-contractor to undertake the research work. 
III. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK 
1. Objective 
To produce a research paper to help MPI/DSI formulate Viet Nam national socioeconomic 
development strategy for the period 2011-2020. 
2. Scope of work 
The institution will develop a high quality research paper that includes (i) a review of regional and 
international experiences in financing the modernization and development of health services, 
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches; (ii) an assessment of Viet 
Nam’s current health sector and financing arrangements; and (iii) recommendations for future 
health sector development priorities and financing channels in Viet Nam. The research paper 
should synthesize and build on ongoing health sector work in Viet Nam, including the 
Government’s health sector development strategy (2006-2010), ongoing drafting of a national 
health sector development strategy and various donor supported initiatives1. The paper should not 
duplicate these efforts, but provide a synthesis of this work, with concrete strategic options for 
financing health sector modernization and development. The paper should provide clear 
recommendations for all levels of the Vietnamese health system. The assignment duration is 
specified in Section I. Within this time frame, a detailed work schedule will be worked out by 
MPI/DSI and the institution (in cooperation with UNDP), upon signing contract. 
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IV. SPECIFIC TASKS OF THE ASSIGNMENT 
Discuss with MPI/DSI/the project management and UNDP and agree on, among others, (i) 
expectations for this assignment and the subcontractor, (ii) research methodologies/approaches 
(based on the methodologies/approaches proposed in the technical bidding document), (iii) 
detailed research plan (which is proposed in the technical bidding document), and (iv) payment 
schedule. 
Collect information necessary for the preparation of the paper 
Prepare the paper as specified in this TOR, including consultations with DSI, UNDP, and other 
national partners (during the process of conducting the research) to ensure the research work will 
be built on sound knowledge of Viet Nam’s context as well as its relevance and applicability. 
Send the first draft research paper (in English and Vietnamese) to project management for 
circulation to relevant stakeholders and experts for peer reviews and comments 
Prepare, based on the comments and feedback, a second draft of the paper (in English and 
Vietnamese) and present it to the Sub-Committee’s SEDS Drafting Team members and 
representatives from relevant sectors; facilitate or take active roles in 
The team should draw on any documentation from Government-donor partnership on health (a 
cooperation accord with international and domestic partners to increase the efficiency of 
international health assistance to Viet Nam was signed on 31 March 2009). Other potential English 
sources of information are WB, 2009, Health Financing and Delivery in Vietnam: Looking Forward: 
ADB, Health Human Resource Sector Development Program Documents. SIDA and WHO have 
also been actively involved in health sector planning and policy development in Viet Nam. the 
discussions on the research topics (in a one-day workshop or in 1-2 other roundtables, including 
with the selected SEDS Sub-Committee members, on these topics as DSI/project management 
may find necessary). 
Revise and finalise the paper (in English and Vietnamese) after consultation and submit it (in both 
hard and soft copy) to the Project Management Board and UNDP. 
V. EXPECTED DELIVERABLES AND QUALITY INDICATORS 
1. Expected deliverables 
A research paper that (i) reviews regional and international experiences in financing the 
development and modernization of health services, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative approaches; (ii) provides a comprehensive assessment of Viet Nam’s current health 
sector and financing arrangements; and (iii) sets out recommendations for future health sector 
development priorities and financing channels in Viet Nam. 
2. Quality criteria 
The research paper should include at least the following sections: 
1. A review of major approaches in regional and international strategies and institutional 
arrangements (including private-public linkages) for financing the development and modernization 
of health systems, including, including a detailed review of options for developing health insurance. 
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2. Comprehensive assessment of Viet Nam’s current health sector and existing financing sources, 
including: 
Hospitals (health examination and treatment establishments) 
Preventive health care 
Human resource 
Health care science and technology 
Ability to meet the demand for health care services 
Population’s accessibility to health care services, focusing on that of the group of poor people 
(against the objective of ensuring equity and efficiency in provision of and access to health care 
services) 
Sources of health sector financing: state budget, private investment 
(domestic and foreign), hospital fees, health insurance, and ODA. 
3. Commonly used effective health sector financing instruments (including insurance) from 
international experience and good practices 
4. Recommendations for future health sector development priorities and financing channels in Viet 
Nam: 
District hospitals (issue of government bonds has been decided, but not sufficient to meet the 
demand. New reliable and sustainable sources of financing required) 
Expansion and modernization of provincial general hospitals in provinces with large population, or 
regional or inter-provincial hospitals (to provide directly high quality health services to local people, 
reducing overcapacity in hospitals in Ha Noi in Ho Chi Minh City while enabling the people to save 
money by no longer needing to go to these cities for health services) 
Upgrading or new establishment of a number of specialised hospitals that are highly demanded 
(cancer, cardio-vascular, lung, eye examination and treatment) 
Options to establish some regional class modern hospitals to provide high quality health services 
to the Vietnamese people in need (to discourage them from going abroad for health examination 
and treatment services) and to foreigners (who live in Viet Nam or who go to Viet Nam for tourism 
or convalescence purposes. (Singaporean and Bangkok models may be relevant) 
Modernisation of preventive health care system 
5. Recommended policies to achieve equity and efficiency objectives in health care provision and 
easy access (for everyone) to quality health care services 
6. Other contents may be suggested by project management. 
Concrete evidence and information sources should be presented in the paper to support the 
analysis. 
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The paper should be written clearly, logically, and understandably with a short executive summary 
of key research findings and recommendations. The paper can be written in English and translated 
into Vietnamese. 
VI. MONITORING AND QUALITY CONTROLS 
The detailed work plan agreed between the institution and the project management/UNDP and the 
quality criteria above will serve as the basis for monitoring and evaluating work progress of the 
institution. 
The project will cooperate with UNDP in instituting quality controls. 
The project will be responsible for providing the institution and its experts with national information, 
materials, documents, contact details, etc. as deemed necessary for the assignment. 
Chapter 1: Health Status and Determinants 
 Oxford Policy Management 51 
Annex B Key Informant Visits 
                
N
o 
Organization Objectives  Data Requirements Time Note 
UNDP: SEDS 
Project  
 
Clarify objectives of the mission, 
understand the role of UNDP, and 
collect context information on the 
health sector. 
 9h-10h, 14/2 
Monday. 
Confirmed  
Ms. Lan Anh: 
0439421495/2
81 or 
0903209059 
Room 204, Ministry of Planning & 
Investment. 65 Van Mieu, Hanoi 
UNICEF  
Tel: 
3.942.5706 - 
11 
 
 
Discuss about current situation of  
Health sector, especially focus on 
Health care Financing Strategy in 
Vietnam  
-Documents related to Health sector 
and Health Care Financing  
15h30-16h30, 
14/2 Monday. 
Confirmed  
Mr. Thien: 0936893808 
Fl 7, Mr. Jean Dupraz, 81A Tran 
Quoc Toan, Hoan Kiem, Hanoi 
MOH: 
Department of 
Planning & 
Financing 
 
 
Understand current situation of Health 
Care Financing in VN (Revenue & 
expenditure,  Payment mechanisms, 
...) and  
Health Financing Strategy 2010-2020 
 
- % of consolidated (central and 
province) budget allocated to 
hospitals and PHC:  2006 - to most 
recent year available, by province  
-Breakdown of consolidated budget 
expenditure by input (e.g. staffing / 
medicines...), by province for the 
most recent year 
- Assessment of implementation of 
Health Financing reforms such as 
Autonomy and socialization in 
Hospitals 
8h-10h00, 15/2 
Tuesday. 
Confirmed 
Mr. Lien: 0913211531 
62732273/1515 Ms Nga 
MOH, 138 Giang Vo, Hanoi 
MOH: Policy 
Unit  
Sarah Bales – 
External 
Consultant 
0913598420 
-Discuss about Health Financing 
Lessons from region and comparable 
countries 
 10.15-11.30 
15/2 
Tuesday. 
Confirmed, Sarah Bales – External 
Consultant 
0913598420 
138 Giang Vo 
WORLD BANK 
Minh 
Discuss about current situation of  
Health sector, especially focus on 
- Documents related to Health sector 
and Health Care Financing  
14h-15h, 15/2 
Tuesday 
Confirmed  
8th floor, 63 Ly Thai To Street. Mr. 
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39346600/228 Health care Financing Strategy in 
Vietnam  
Tomas Palu, Human Development 
Sector Coordinator  
Health 
Strategic & 
Policy 
Instritute 
 
38234167 
Discuss about current situation of  
Health sector, especially focus on 
Health care Financing Strategy in 
Vietnam  
-Provider payment mechanisms 
between Health Insurance & Health 
care providers 
-Roadmap to Universal HI 
-Experience from International 
10h15-11h30, 
16/2 Wednesday 
Confirmed  
Mr. Tien: 0903454155 
138 Giang Vo, Hanoi 
MOH: 
Administration 
of Medical 
Care 
Discuss about current situation of 
Service Provision & Quality of Care 
- Results of Hospital Inventory from 
2006 up to now 
8h30-10h, 17/2 
Thursday 
Confirmed  
Mr. Khoa: 0913395903 
138 Giang Vo, Hanoi 
MOH: 
Department of 
Health 
Insurance 
-HI policies 
-Implementation of HI law 
-Roadmap for Universal HI 
-Reform in Payment Mechanism 
 10h-11h, 17/2 
Thursday 
 
Confirmed  
Hương: 0913252280 
138 Giang Vo, Hanoi 
Viet nam 
Social Security 
Org. 
39347965; 
39344160 
-HI policies 
-Implementation of HI law 
-Roadmap for Universal HI 
-Reform in Payment Mechanism 
- Health Insurance coverage and 
revenue collection at the national 
and province level by group. 
- Insurance sustainability through 
comparing the revenue and 
expenditure data by insurance group 
over time (e.g. 2006 to most recent 
year) 
- Utilization of services by the 
insured by group over time 
14h-15h, 17/2 
Thursday 
Confirmed 
Van: 0912176038 
2, Trang Thi, Hanoi 
10 WHO  
 
Discuss about current situation of  
Health sector, especially focus on 
Health care Financing Strategy in 
Vietnam  
-Documents related to Health sector 
and Health Care Financing  
15.30-16.30, 
17/2, Thursday    
Confirmed. 
Ms. Kim Phuong 
63 Tran Hung Dao  
Ha Noi, 
Tel 4 3943 3734/5/6 
Ext. 83834 
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11 Ministry of 
Finance 
(MOF): Dept. 
of State 
Budget 
Understand the current situation (Tax 
revenue, government budget for 
Health...) and   
Health Financing strategy  
for the time coming (2010 – 2020) 
 
-Total central and province 
government tax revenue collected 
via direct and indirect taxes - 2006 
to most recent year, by province (if 
possible) 
-Central and province budget 
allocations allocated to health - 2006 
to most recent year, by province 
-Government budget allocation to 
health insurance fund to cover 
contribution shortfall 
8h-10h,18/2 
Friday 
Will be confirmed by next Tues.  
22202828/3161; 0912272667 Mr. 
Phuong 
28 Tran Hung Dao, Hoan Kiem, 
Hanoi 
12 Bạch Mai 
Hospital  
38693731/201
4 
Lâm 
Site visit 
Feedback on current health financing 
mechanisms/policy 
-Recommendations for future  
 
 
 14h-16h, 18/2 
Friday 
Processing 
13 Provincial 
Health Bureau; 
Provincial 
Hospital;  
District 
Hospital;  
Commune 
Health Station 
& Health 
Insurance 
Office in Vinh 
Phuc Province 
-Site visit 
-Feedback on current health financing 
mechanisms/policy 
-Recommendations for future  
 
 21-22/2 
Monday & 
Tuesday 
Confirmed by Xuân – Tel. 
0912666755 
 
14 DSI – Nguyen 
Ba An 
-Summary on Main Results 
-Discuss about Report  
 9h-10h; 24/2 
Thursday 
Processing 
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Annex C Health Insurance coverage in Viet Nam 
C.1 Trends in health insurance coverage (1993-2010) 
Total In which 
Year Average Population No of 
people 
% 
compared 
with 
population 
Compulsory The poor Voluntary 
1993  70,185     3,790  5.40     3,470           -         320  
1994  71,671     4,260  5.94     3,720           -         540  
1995  71,996     7,100  9.86     4,870           -      2,230  
1996  73,157     8,630  11.80     5,560           -      3,070  
1997  74,307     9,540  12.84     5,730           -      3,810  
1998  75,456     9,892  13.11     6,069        134     3,689  
1999  76,597   10,232  13.36     6,355        493     3,384  
2000  76,734   10,622  13.84     6,394        841     3,387  
2001  77,655   11,340  14.60     6,685     1,214     3,441  
2002  78,587   13,032  16.58     6,975     1,665     4,392  
2003  79,530   16,471  20.71     8,118     3,254     5,099  
2004  80,484   18,356  22.81     8,190     3,772     6,394  
2005  81,450   23,434  28.77     9,574     4,726     9,133  
2006  82,427   36,866  44.73   10,568   15,178   11,120  
2007  83,416   36,545  43.81   11,667   15,499     9,379  
2008  84,417   39,749  47.09   13,529   15,530   10,690  
2009  86,025   50,069  58.20   19,609   15,113   15,347  
2010  86,866   50,771  58.45   33,343   13,511     3,917  
Source:  Ministry of Health (Feb, 2011) 
 
Chapter 1: Health Status and Determinants 
 Oxford Policy Management 55 
C.2 Health Insurance Coverage, by region (2009) 
Province/City Population No.of insured  % 
Total    86,024,500     50,069,998     58.20  
1. Red river delta   19,631,556    10,814,642    55.09  
1 Hà Nội       6,466,497        3,691,441     57.09  
2 Vĩnh Phúc       1,003,579           586,442     58.44  
3 Bắc Ninh       1,026,956           440,825     42.93  
4 Quảng Ninh       1,147,515           712,443     62.09  
5 Hải Dương       1,708,157           900,937     52.74  
6 Hải Phòng       1,842,333        1,039,443     56.42  
7 Hưng Yên       1,131,793           507,046     44.80  
8 Thái Bình       1,785,831        1,168,112     65.41  
9 Hà Nam          787,207           427,807     54.34  
10 Nam Định       1,830,771           855,335     46.72  
11 Ninh Bình          900,919           484,811     53.81  
2. Midland and northern mountainous   11,094,748      7,123,730    64.21  
12 Hà Giang          726,337           434,467     59.82  
13 Cao Bằng          512,283           467,985     91.35  
14 Bắc Kạn          295,467           285,211     96.53  
15 Tuyên Quang          727,454           426,548     58.64  
16 Lào Cai          614,754           510,350     83.02  
17 Yên Bái          742,934           437,309     58.86  
18 Thái Nguyên       1,127,866           862,532     76.47  
19 Lạng Sơn          733,891           382,106     52.07  
20 Bắc Giang       1,559,980           734,676     47.10  
21 Phú Thọ       1,317,524           381,539     28.96  
22 Điện Biên          492,391           468,530     95.15  
23 Lai Châu          371,149           320,907     86.46  
24 Sơn La       1,083,600           945,262     87.23  
25 Hoà Bình          789,119           466,308     59.09  
3. North central coast and south central coast   18,887,064    11,357,632    60.13  
26 Thanh Hoá       3,409,550        2,217,200     65.03  
27 Nghệ An       2,921,032        1,604,041     54.91  
28 Hà Tĩnh       1,230,916           717,724     58.31  
29 Quảng Bình          849,243           514,944     60.64  
30 Quảng Trị          599,623           402,442     67.12  
31 Thừa Thiên Huế       1,090,557           773,292     70.91  
32 Đà Nẵng          889,498           671,235     75.46  
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33 Quảng Nam       1,423,390           955,871     67.15  
34 Quảng Ngãi       1,220,492           718,367     58.86  
35 Bình Định       1,490,012           928,695     62.33  
36 Phú Yên          864,353           445,122     51.50  
37 Khánh Hoà       1,160,071           578,028     49.83  
38 Ninh Thuận          565,674           268,848     47.53  
39 Bình Thuận       1,172,652           561,823     47.91  
4. The Central Highland     5,121,423      3,235,472    63.18  
40 Kon Tum          431,215           307,357     71.28  
41 Gia Lai       1,276,277           854,096     66.92  
42 Đắk Lắk       1,733,113        1,137,095     65.61  
43 Đắk Nông          490,782           276,910     56.42  
44 Lâm Đồng       1,190,036           660,014     55.46  
5. South East    14,063,794      8,307,968    59.07  
45 Bình Phước          877,357           315,632     35.98  
46 Tây Ninh       1,069,322           529,368     49.51  
47 Bình Dương       1,486,696        1,007,516     67.77  
48 Đồng Nai       2,490,011        1,163,567     46.73  
49 Bà Rịa - Vũng Tàu          997,561           732,249     73.40  
50 TP.Hồ Chí Minh       7,142,847        4,559,636     63.83  
6. The Mekong region   17,225,914      9,230,554    53.59  
51 Long An       1,440,849           903,073     62.68  
52 Tiền Giang       1,674,790           804,205     48.02  
53 Bến Tre       1,258,025           725,902     57.70  
54 Trà Vinh       1,003,674           807,522     80.46  
55 Vĩnh Long       1,031,181           624,711     60.58  
56 Đồng Tháp       1,669,981           959,132     57.43  
57 An Giang       2,150,645           976,107     45.39  
58 Kiên Giang       1,687,758           977,249     57.90  
59 Cần Thơ       1,190,340           563,356     47.33  
60 Hậu Giang          758,697           316,835     41.76  
61 Sóc Trăng       1,292,972           685,918     53.05  
62 Bạc Liêu          858,595           461,074     53.70  
63 Cà Mau       1,208,408           425,470     35.21  
Source:  Ministry of Health (Feb, 2011) 
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C.3 Breakdown of health insurance, by Group (2010) 
TT Participants Target groups With HI 
Percentage 
( %) Without HI 
 Total  86,866 50,771 58.45 36,095 
I. Compusory groups 67,114 46,854 69.81 20,260 
1. Enterprises and other organizations 11,911 6,361 53.40 5,550 
2. Administrative  3,142 3,142 100.00 0 
3. Foreign students studying in Vietnam 3 3 100.00 0 
4.  Part-time commune officials 182 0 0.00 182 
5. Persons on pension  920 920 100.00 0 
6. People on monthly social insurance allowance 1,305 1,254 96.09 51 
7. People on unemployment allowance 80   0.00 80 
8. Commune officials from the state budget allowance 41 40 97.56 1 
9. Merit persons with revolution  1,791 1,791 100.00 0 
10. Veterans 374 350 93.58 24 
11. People who personally participated in the war  322 0 0.00 322 
12. Representatives of National Assembly, People’s council 
123 119 96.75 4 
13. Social protection 843 384 45.55 459 
14. The poor, ethnic minority people  13,945 13,511 96.89 434 
15. Relatives of merit people 869 0 0.00 869 
16. Relatives of police, army 1,281 297 23.19 984 
17. Children under 6 years old 10,103 8,183 81.00 1,920 
18. Members of households living just above the poverty line 
6,081 692 11.38 5,389 
19. Pupils and Students 13,798 9,807 71.08 3,991 
II. Voluntory groups 18,552 3,917 21.11 14,635 
20. Relatives of employees 6,820   0.00 6,820 
21. Farmers with average living standards up, members of cooperatives….. 
11,732 3,917 33.39 7,815 
Source:  Ministry of Health (2010) 
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C.4 Breakdown of coverage by source of contribution 
Participants Target groups With HI 
Percentage 
( %) 
Without 
HI 
Total  86,866 50,771 58.45 36,095 
1. Contributed by Employee&employer 15,238 9,506 62.38 5,732 
Enterprises and other organizations 11,911 6,361 53.40 5,550 
Administrative  3,142 3,142 100.00 0 
Foreign students studying in Vietnam 3 3 100.00 0 
 Part-time commune officials 182 0 0.00 182 
2. Contributed by Social securities 
Fund 
2,305 2,174 94.32 131 
Persons on pension  920 920 100.00 0 
People on monthly social insurance 
allowance 
1,305 1,254 96.09 51 
People on unemployment allowance 80 0 0.00 80 
3. Contributed by the State budget 30,561 24,675 80.74 5,886 
Commune officials from the state budget 
allowance 
41 40 97.56 1 
Merit persons with revolution  1,791 1,791 100.00 0 
Veterans 374 350 93.58 24 
People who personally participated in the 
war  
322 0 0.00 322 
Representatives of National Assembly, 
People’s council 
123 119 96.75 4 
Social protection 843 384 45.55 459 
The poor, ethnic minority people  13,945 13,511 96.89 434 
Relatives of merit people 869 0 0.00 869 
Relatives of police, army 1,281 297 23.19 984 
Children under 6 years old 10,103 8,183 81.00 1,920 
4.State budget group health insurance 
premium support 19,879 10,499 52.81 9,380 
Members of households living just above 
the poverty line 
6,081 692 11.38 5,389 
Pupils and Students 13,798 9,807 71.08 3,991 
5. Paid by Individuals 18,552 3,917 21.11 14,635 
Relatives of employees 6,820 0 0.00 6,820 
Farmers with average living standards up, 
members of cooperatives….. 
11,732 3,917 33.39 7,815 
Source:  Ministry of Health (Feb 2011) 
